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Recent changes to the way the U.S. Department of Justice decides whether to pursue 
capital charges have made it more likely that the federal death penalty will be sought in cases in 
which the criminal conduct occurred within States that do not authorize capital punishment for 
any crime.  As a result, since 2002, five people have been sentenced to death in federal court for
conduct that occurred in States that do not authorize the death penalty.  This state of affairs is in 
serious tension with the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”  A complete understanding of the Bill of Rights can be achieved only by placing 
primary emphasis on the views of the Anti-Federalists, who conditioned ratification of the 
Constitution on the inclusion of such a Bill.  Such an account of the Bill of Rights recognizes 
that, with respect to most if not all of its provisions, “structural” and “individual rights” 
concerns are intertwined.  That is, these provisions tie the protection of individual rights to the 
preservation of State sovereignty from the danger of federal encroachment.  In particular, recent 
scholarship suggests that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill were in large part 
motivated by a desire on the part of the Anti-Federalists to make it more difficult for the federal 
government to investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish for crime, traditionally a prerogative 
of the States.  It follows from this that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments” was designed primarily to restrain the federal power to punish in a way that 
conflicts with the norms of an individual State.  Thus, the imposition of the death penalty by the 
federal government in any State that does not impose that mode of punishment constitutes “cruel 
and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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1WHEN THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY IS “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”
by
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer
The death sentence imposed on Gary Sampson on January 29, 2004 in Massachusetts1 must 
have come as quite a surprise to many people in that State.  After all, the State had not had a death 
penalty statute on the books since 1984,2 and no one had been executed there in nearly six decades.3
Nevertheless, Sampson was eligible for, and ultimately received, a sentence of death because he was 
tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal court, and the federal death penalty statutes make no 
distinction between defendants tried in districts located in States that have the death penalty and 
those tried in districts located in States that do not.  Such a distinction has been largely unnecessary 
because, until recently, local federal prosecutors, when deciding whether to seek the death penalty, 
heavily weighed the local feelings about the death penalty, and generally did not seek the ultimate 
sanction where the State had no provision for the death penalty.  Recently, however, the Attorney 
General has decided to overrule such decisions in a number of cases in an effort to make the death 
penalty more uniform throughout the nation.  As a result, five federal defendants since 2002 have 
been sentenced to die in federal court for crimes committed within States that do not authorize capital 
punishment for any crime.
1 See 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/01/29/sampson_receives_states_first_federal_death_
sentence/ (last viewed June 8, 2005).
2 See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 128 (Mass. 1984) (striking down state’s death penalty 
law).
3 The last execution in Massachusetts occurred on May 9, 1947, when Philip Bellino and Edward Gertson 
were executed for murder.  See Brian Hauck et al., Capital Punishment Legislation in Massachusetts, 36 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 479, 482 & n.24 (1999).
2This Article argues that such efforts by the Attorney General to achieve national uniformity 
are not only misguided but are also unconstitutional.  Specifically, it argues that the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibits the federal government 
from imposing a sentence of death in any State that does not itself impose that punishment.  While 
certainly novel, this proposition is faithful to the vision of the Anti-Federalist proponents of the Bill 
of Rights, by imposing an important constraint on the central government and reposing ultimate 
authority in the people of the several States to decide whether a particular mode of punishment is 
acceptable within their respective borders.  Moreover, this proposed rule relies on two well accepted 
principles of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  First, this rule is addressed to the constitutionality of 
a mode of punishment, and while the current Justices on the Supreme Court are in wide disagreement 
over whether and to what extent the Eight Amendment forbids disproportionate punishments, all 
agree that it does address whether particular modes of punishment pass constitutional muster.  And, 
second, the proposed rule relies solely on objective and readily ascertainable evidence regarding the 
acceptability of the death penalty – whether the people of a State have indeed accepted it – and while 
some Justices believe that the Court is required to go beyond the objective evidence in determining 
whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual,” all agree that such objective evidence must be given 
first priority.
Part I of this Article looks at the federal death penalty and its recent application to 
defendants who committed crimes in States that do not authorize capital punishment.  Part II reviews 
the Supreme Court’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence on “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” distilling four main principles from that jurisprudence:  that those Amendments 
prohibit punishments not authorized by law; that they forbid certain modes of punishment; that they 
prohibit non-capital punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the crime; and that they 
3categorically bar certain classes of offenses and offenders from receiving capital punishment. Part 
III looks at the Eighth Amendment from an Anti-Federalist point of view.  This Part advances  the 
view of the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights, not as assuring the general fairness 
and reliability of the federal criminal process, but as creating obstacles to the investigation, 
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of persons for federal crimes.  This view treats the 
protection of criminal defendants at the federal level as intimately intertwined with the protection of 
state prerogatives in addressing crime, and treats the Eighth Amendment as a particular embodiment 
of this interconnectedness of individual and collective rights.
Part IV recovers the original Eighth Amendment from the alloy that has been produced by 
mixing it with the Fourteenth in the crucible of incorporation.  This Part re-examines the principles 
of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in light of the Anti-Federalist approach to the Bill of 
Rights and distills the key principle of the Eighth Amendment in its pure form, unmediated by the 
demands of the Fourteenth:  the prohibition of particular modes of punishment, as informed by the 
use of inter-jurisdictional comparisons of punishments for identical or similar crimes.  This Part then 
proposes that the Eighth Amendment be read as restraining the federal power to utilize a particular 
mode of punishment, including the death penalty, when that power conflicts with the norms of an 
individual State.  Finally, this Part discusses possible objections to this approach.
I. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
The federal government has always exacted death as the price for the most serious crimes.  
Only recently, however, as a result of the process of federalization of crime, has the federal death 
penalty covered so many crimes that traditionally were left to the States to punish.  Even more 
recently, the Department of Justice has instituted policies to increase national uniformity in the 
imposition of the death penalty.  The result of the confluence of these two trends is that five current
4prisoners on federal death row committed their crimes in States that do not authorize capital 
punishment.
A. History and Scope of the Federal Death Penalty
Shortly after the First Congress approved the Bill of Rights, it drafted a federal crime bill 
that attached the penalty of death by hanging to several of the crimes it created.4  Among the capital 
crimes created were treason, murder on federal land, forgery, uttering forged securities, 
counterfeiting, and various offenses, including piracy, committed on the high seas.5  In 1897, 
Congress reduced the number of capital crimes to five.6 Although the death penalty was expanded
over the next several decades, only thirty-four people were executed by the federal government from 
1927 through 1963.7
The federal government was effectively without a death penalty for 16 years after the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia8 ushered in a new era of death penalty 
jurisprudence.9  While several pre-Furman statutes continued to authorize the death penalty for some 
4 See Christopher Q. Cutler, Death Resurrected: The Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23 
Seattle U.L. Rev. 1189, 1193 (2000); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about 
the Department of Justice's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 349, 360, 365 (1999) [hereinafter Little, History]; Rory 
K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 529, 538 (2000) [hereinafter Little, 
Future].
5 See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1193; Little, History, supra note 4, at 362-63; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 
538.
6 See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1195; Little, History, supra note 4, at 367; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 538.
7 See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1193; George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 325, 329 (1996); 
Little, History, supra note 4, at 370; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 539.
8 408 U.S. 232 (1972).
9 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 349.
5federal crimes, these statutes were likely unconstitutional because they did not provide for 
procedures the Supreme Court had announced were required by the Eighth Amendment.10
However, the federal government re-introduced the death penalty with the Anti-Drug 
Abuse and Death Penalty Act of 1988, also known informally as the Drug Kingpin Act,11 which 
“added the death penalty for a very narrow realm of cases in which murder resulted from a drug 
related offense.”12  The federal government greatly expanded the scope of the death penalty in 1994 
with the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”),13 “a revolution for federal capital punishment.”14
The “FDPA substantially increased the availability of the death penalty for federal offenders” by:  
creating several new death-eligible crimes; authorizing the death penalty for several pre-existing 
federal crimes; and detailing the procedures to be employed for pre-existing statutes that already 
provided for the death penalty but that were likely unconstitutional after Furman.15 Although the 
number of new death-eligible federal offenses is “open to interpretation,’”16  by most counts the 
FDPA created sixty capital crimes.17  Moreover, other than “treason against the federal government 
10 Se  Sandra D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 79, 86 & n.26 (1992); Little, History, supra note 4, at 349 n.5, 373-76.
11 See John P. Cunningham, Comment, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of the Federal 
Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939, 950 (1998).
12 Charles C. Boettcher, Comment, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 29 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 
1043, 1054 (1998).
13 See John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the United States, 16 Wash. U. J.L. 
& Pol’y 195, 210-11 (2004); Little, History, supra note 4, at 381-88; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 539.
14 Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1057.
15 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 388-91.
16 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 391 (quoting Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Developments, The New 
Federal Death Penalties, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 293, 297 n.21 (1994)).
17 See Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1057; Brigham, supra note 13, at 211; Cunningham, supra note 11, at  952; 
Cutler, supra note 4, at 1209-10 & n.150; Eldred, supra note 16, at 293 n.2; Kannar, supra note 7, at 328.
6[and] offenses committed exclusively on federal territory,”18 every crime covered by the Kingpin 
Act and the FDPA is also punishable pursuant to the laws of the several States.19 Indeed, every 
single one of the 40 current federal death row prisoners might have been tried, convicted, and 
sentenced for murder in State court.20
B. The Federal Death Penalty in States Without Capital Punishment
As of this writing, capital punishment is unauthorized by twelve States:  Alaska, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.21 Yet the federal death penalty applies nationwide, even in those States 
18 Little, Future, supra note 4, at 542.
19 See Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1054-55, 1058-59; Cunningham, supra note 11, at 954-55; Eldred, supra 
note 16, at 296-97; Little, History, supra note 4, at 388-91 & nn.232, 237, 238; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 541; 
Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn't Welcome Here: Evaluating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a 
State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1435, 1440 (2001); Brian Serr, Of Crime and 
Punishment, Kingpins and Footsoldiers, Life and Death: The Drug War and the Federal Death Penalty Provision –
Problems of Interpretation and Constitutionality, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 895, 906- 18 (1993); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs 
and Death: Congress Authorizes the Death Penalty for Certain Drug-Related Murders, 18 J. Contemp. L. 47, 69 
(1992).
20 See Little, Future, supra note 4, at 532-33 (“[O]f the twenty-six federal defendants that have been sentenced 
to death since 1988 [as of 2000], all were convicted of criminal conduct duplicative of capital murder conduct as 
defined by the states in which the murders occurred.”).  See also Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty 
Moratorium?, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 791, 802-07 (2001).  For an update to Little’s work, see 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).  Despite the fact that 
some of these crimes occurred on federal property, the defendants’ “conduct plainly violated state murder statutes,” 
Little, Future, supra note 4, at 533 n.17, and “there is no theoretical reason that states could not be given authority to 
prosecute crimes committed on federal property within their borders.”  For a helpful chart demonstrating the state 
crimes for which these federal prisoners could have been prosecuted, see id. at 543-44.
21 Se Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1201 (2005).  Although Kansas has a death penalty statute, it was 
invalidated in State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004).  However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to hear 
the case.  See Kansas v. Marsh, 73 USLW 3539 (U.S. Kan. May 31, 2005) (NO. 04-1170).  New York also has a 
death penalty statute that recently was invalidated in People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).  The state did 
not petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, see e-mail correspondence from Barbara Zolot, 
Supervising Attorney, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York, N.Y., dated June 8, 2005 (on file with author), 
and its time for doing so has expired.  Prospects in New York for reinstatement of the death penalty appear dim.  See 
Patrick D. Healy, “Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to be Revived,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2005.  Thus, the number of 
non-death penalty jurisdictions may soon rise to thirteen or fourteen.
7that do not authorize capital punishment for any crime.22  Indeed, the FDPA expressly contemplates 
this, for it provides that if the conviction takes place in a State that does not authorize capital 
punishment, the court must designate another State where the sentence may be executed.23
Moreover, “although the new federal statutes do not demand national uniformity in administration of 
the federal death penalty, such a legislative policy is strongly implied.” 24
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also has expressed a goal of avoiding geographical 
disparity in the imposition of the federal death penalty.25 To achieve this end, DOJ has centralized 
federal death penalty prosecutions by instituting formal Capital Case Protocols.  These Protocols
require approval of the Attorney General via a Death Penalty Evaluation form before the death 
penalty is sought in any federal case.26  In addition, even in cases where the local U.S. Attorney 
22 See Jordan, supra note 10, at 85 (observing that the 1988 Act “imposes the death penalty in states that have 
not enacted legislation to execute their citizens, even for the most heinous crimes”); Little, History, supra note 4, at 
472 (“Congress has written a federal death penalty statute which is applicable nationally and contains no express 
suggestions or endorsement of regional disparities in its implementation.”); Morton, supra note 19, at 1436 (“[T]he 
absence of a state capital punishment regime in a given state would not bar a federal capital prosecution in that state 
. . . .”); Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce 
Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 721, 731 (2002) (“[M]ost striking [in terms of federal/state 
sentencing disparity] are the federal death penalty cases in states that do not authorize capital punishment.”); see 
also Brigham, supra note 13, at 216 (“[N]o jurisdiction will be able to declare itself a death penalty free zone.’”) 
(quoting Eric Goldscheider, “Fed’s Death Penalty Net Casts Ever Wider,” Boston Globe, June 11, 2000, at E1).
23 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 404; see also Brigham, supra note 13, at 225 n.133; Cunningham, supra 
note 11, at 957; Cutler, supra note 4, at 1214; Jordan, supra note 10, at 91; Kannar, supra note 7, at 331; Morton, 
supra note 19, at 1444.
24 Little, History, supra note 4, at 431-32.  Little notes that that “one goal” of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 “was to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities’ among similar cases and defendants across the 
country.”  Id. at 436 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)); see also id. at 472 (similar); id. at. 356 (asserting that 
Congress “has stated a general sentencing policy that regional disparities’ should be avoided.”).
25 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 439 (“[I]t appears to be current DOJ policy that, as best as humanly 
possible, the federal death penalty be administered uniformly across the nation.”); John Gleeson, Supervising 
Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against 
the Death Penalty, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1697, 1699 (2003) (stating that DOJ has attempted “to achieve national uniformity 
in the imposition of the death penalty”).
26 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual §§ 9-10.020, 9-10.040 (updated June 7, 2001) 
(online at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam) [hereinafter 2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual]; accord 
Little, History, supra note 4, at 407; see also id. at 424 (“Only the Attorney General can make a final decision 
regarding the death penalty.”).
8could, but does  not, request permission from the Attorney General to seek the death penalty, she 
must still complete such a form.27
Three significant changes instituted shortly after President George W. Bush took power 
have made it more likely that the U.S. government would seek the death penalty at a higher rate than 
previously in districts within States that do not authorize capital punishment.  First, prior to that 
time, “recommendation[s] . . . against seeking death in a death-eligible case [were] almost always 
accepted . . . because U.S. Attorneys generally exercise great care in submitting their 
recommendations and are presumed to know their local communities, jury pools, judges, and the 
overall strengths and weaknesses of their particular case far better than Main Justice personnel.”28
By contrast, in more recent cases, the decision to seek the death penalty in several cases was made 
over the contrary recommendations of the local U.S. Attorneys.29
Second, prior to 2001, a local U.S. Attorney was required to submit a Death Penalty 
Evaluation form when a “defendant [was] charge[d] . . . with an offense subject to the death 
penalty.’”30  The DOJ, under the leadership of newly appointed Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
amended the Protocols in June 2001, to require submission of the form whenever the local U.S. 
Attorney has charged a defendant with “an offense that is punishable by death or conduct that could 
be charged as an offense punishable by death.”31  The intent of the change is obvious.  Under the 
prior version of the Protocols, a local U.S. Attorney could evade DOJ review of the decision not to 
27 See 2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 26, § 9-10.040; accord Little, History, supra note 4, at 408.
28 Little, History, supra note 4, at 422; see also Gleeson, supra note 25, at 1715 (“U.S. Attorneys know . . . 
how the communities they serve and protect perceive crimes and evaluate punishments.”).
29 See Shelley Murphy, “Death Penalty Foes Rap Ashcroft,” Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 2003 (online at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/09/20/death_penalty_foes_rap_ashcroft?mode=PF ).
30 Little, History, supra note 4, at 409-10 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-
10.040 (updated Jan. 8, 1999)) [hereinafter 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual]) (alteration in original).
31 2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 26, § 9-10.040 (emphasis added).
9seek the death penalty through the simple expedient of declining to charge the defendant with a 
capital crime but instead charging him with a lesser offense.  Thus could a U.S. Attorney in a State 
with no death penalty adhere to local views on capital punishment and avoid acceding to the 
otherwise mandatory DOJ review.  Under the revised version of the Protocols, the only way for a 
local U.S. Attorney to evade such review is by declining to obtain an indictment of the defendant at 
all.  Otherwise, the DOJ reviews every case in which a defendant’s alleged conduct subjects him to 
the federal death penalty.
The final change implemented by the Bush administration is the most significant.  The 
Protocols have always “suggest[ed] that a federal indictment should be returned in a potential death 
penalty case only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more substantial than the interests 
of the State or local authorities.’”32 This instruction suggests a presumption in favor of state rather 
than federal prosecution.33 Prior to the revisions, however, “[t]he protocols expressly direct[ed] that 
. . . penalty-driven decisions to file federal charges are inappropriate:  the fact that the maximum 
Federal penalty is death [where the relevant state’s maximum penalty is not] is insufficient, standing 
alone, to show a more substantial interest in Federal prosecution.’”34  This admonition was removed 
from the June 2001 version of the Protocols.35  Although the Protocols do not expressly state that the 
absence of death as a possible punishment in State court is a sufficient reason in and of itself to bring 
32 Little, History, supra note 4, at 413 (quoting 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 30, § 9-
10.070); accord Morton, supra note 19, at 1441..
33 See Little, History, supra note 4, at 464-65 (“[T]he DOJ’s death penalty protocols seem to suggest a 
preference for state prosecution in potential federal capital cases . . . .”); cf. O’Hear, supra note 22, at 733-34 n.73 
(“The presumption in favor of federal prosecution is not so strong in capital cases.”).
34 Little, History, supra note 4, at 414 (quoting 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 30, § 9-
10.070) (alteration in original); see also id. at 466 (“[T]he death penalty protocols make it clear that the fact that the 
death sentence might be available if the case were charged federally, where the conduct occurred in a state that does 
not authorize capital punishment, is not alone’ sufficient to establish a more substantial’ federal interest.”); accord 
Morton, supra note 19, at 1442 & n.49; O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57.
35 See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57; see also Murphy, supra note 29.
10
a federal prosecution, the message to local U.S. Attorneys is unmistakable:  it is now “fair game’ to 
pull a state case into federal court in a bid to win a death sentence.”36
As a result, five of the 40 current federal death row prisoners were tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to death for conduct committed within States that do not authorize capital punishment.37
Marvin Gabrion was sentenced to death on March 16, 2002, for a 1997 murder in Manistee National 
Forest, located in Michigan.38 Gary Sampson was convicted of murdering two men during a 
carjacking in Massachusetts, and he was sentenced to death on January 29, 2004.39  On October 27, 
2004, and June 21, 2005, respectively, federal juries returned verdicts sentencing Dustin Honken and 
Angela Johnson to death for the murder of two girls in Iowa who were witnesses to the murder of 
their mother.40 Most recently, a federal jury in Vermont on July 14, 2005, recommended a sentence 
of death for Donald Fell, who murdered a woman following a carjacking in that State.41
Additionally, Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. has been charged with kidnapping a woman in North Dakota 
36 Murphy, supra note 29 (quoting Donald K. Stern, former US attorney for the District of Massachusetts); see 
also Brigham, supra note 13, at 220 (“[F]ederal capital statutes are sometimes turned to where the availability of the 
death penalty under federal law presents an opportunity to seek harsher punishment where the states do not provide 
a capital sanction.”).
37 Cf. Morton, supra note 19, at 1465 (presciently predicting in 2001 that “it seems almost inevitable . . . that a 
[successful] federal capital prosecution will occur in a state that does not . . . provide for . . . the death penalty” ); 
O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57 (making similar prediction in 2002).
38 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193  (last viewed June 8, 2005).
39 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193  (last viewed June 8, 2005); supra test 
accompanying notes 1 to 3.
40 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193  (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005). 
Although Honken and Johnson have not been formally sentenced as of this writing, the judge is required by the 
jury's verdict to impose the death sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3594; 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193  (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).  It appears that, as of 
this writing, post-trial motions are still pending in that case.  See U.S. v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1052 (N.D. 
Iowa 2005).
41 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193  (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).
11
and murdering her in Minnesota.42   His capital trial is scheduled to start March 6, 2006, in U.S. 
District Court for the District of North Dakota.43 Each of these defendants could have been 
prosecuted on state-law murder charges in Michigan,44 Massachusetts,45 Iowa,46 Vermont,47 or North 
Dakota,48 respectively.  However, none of these states authorizes the punishment of death for murder 
or any other crime.49
Of course, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, provides that the “Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”50  Thus, it appears at first blush that the authorization by Congress of the death 
penalty in federal cases trumps the policy decision of an individual State to eschew capital 
punishment.  But, of course, the U.S. Constitution also contains a later-enacted provision limiting the 
42 See “Dru Sjodin Case: Rodriguez Trial Jury Pool Will Come From Southeastern North Dakota,” Grand 
Fork Herald, Dec. 16, 2004 (online at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforks/news/local/10427569.htm). 
 
43 See id.
44 See Mich. Cons. Laws § 750.316(a) (“A person who commits . . . [m]urder perpetrated by means of poison, 
lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is guilty of first degree murder . . . .”).  
Though Gabrion’s crime occurred on federal land, Michigan has retained concurrent criminal jurisdiction over 
national forest lands in the State.  See Mich. Cons. Laws § 3.401.
45 See Mass. Gen. Laws 265 § 1 (“Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.”).
46 See Iowa Code Ann. § 707.2(1) (“A person commits murder in the first degree when the person . . .
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person.”).
47 See Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2301 (“Murder . . . committed in perpetrating . . . robbery . . . shall be murder in the 
first degree.”).
48 See N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-01(1)(c) (“A person is guilty of murder . . . if the person . . .  commits . . . 
robbery [or] kidnapping . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, 
the person or any other participant in the crime causes the death of any person.”).
49 See supra text accompanying note 21.
50 U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
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federal government’s power to punish.  Does the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual 
punishments”51 have any impact on the ability of the federal government to impose the death penalty 
within the boundaries of a State that chooses not to do so?52 It is to this question that this Article 
now turns.
51
“[C]ruel and unusual punishments [shall not] be inflicted.”  U.S. Const., amend VIII.
52 This question has not been addressed in any systematic fashion.  Professor Rory K. Little has 
acknowledged that “the federalism issues raised by applying a national death penalty law in states that do not accept 
that penalty raise vital questions that go deep into our theories of government as well as criminal punishment.”  
Little, Future, supra note 4, at 573-74.  He allows that “[o]n an issue so sensitive, so irrevocable, and so morally 
defined for many, perhaps recognition of state preferences is not unreasonable.”  Id. at 566.   Yet Little indicates his 
belief that any exemptions for whole states from the federal death penalty “runs counter to the overwhelming 
number of federal criminal sentencing provisions” that stress national uniformity and seek to avoid geographic 
disparities. Id. at 565.   Ultimately, Little leaves the issue for another day.  See id. at 566.
A provision of the Innocence Protection Act of 2000 (“IPA”), introduced in the U.S. Senate, see S. 2073, 
106th Cong., § 401 (2000), would have generally prohibited the federal government from  “seek[ing] the death 
penalty in any case initially brought before a district court of the United States that sits in a State that does not 
prescribe, authorize, or permit the imposition of such penalty for the alleged conduct.”  See Brigham, supra note 13,
at 219; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 564.  However, the Senate sponsors’ belief that they were merely exercising 
legislative grace, rather than acting pursuant to constitutional mandate, is demonstrated by the fact that the 
exemption could have been overridden upon appropriate certification by the Attorney General.  See S. 2073, 106th
Cong., § 401 (2000); Little, Future, supra note 4, at 564-65.  In any event, when the IPA became law in 2004, this 
provision was not included.  See Ronald Weich, The Innocence Protection Act of 2004:  A Small Step Forward and 
a Framework for Larger Reforms, 29 Champion 28, 29 (2005).
Professor John Brigham, quoting an e-mail communication from former Oregon Supreme Court Justice 
Hans Linde, has suggested that “[t]he death penalty no longer is unusual in Texas or Florida, but is highly unusual, 
and arguably regarded as unacceptably cruel, among the people of Massachusetts.”  Brigham, supra note 13, at 214 
n.90.  Brigham has endorsed Linde’s suggestion of “a state-based, relativist interpretation to [sic] the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban against “cruel and unusual” punishments.’”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  However, he has not 
supported this position with any textual, historical, or structural analysis of the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, student commentator Sean Morton has argued that the notion of “cruel and unusual punishments’ 
under the Eighth Amendment should be defined according to local values expressed by individual states through 
fundamental state law.”  Morton, supra note 19, at 1437-38 (footnote omitted).  However, he apparently would limit 
application of this principle in two ways.  First, it would apply only to those States whose constitutions forbid the 
death penalty. See id. at 1463 (“[A] serious difficulty arises when the federal government attempts to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction within a State that affirmatively prohibits the death penalty via that state’s constitution.”) 
(emphasis added).  Second, it would apply only to States that reject “the death penalty as an impermissible cruel and 
unusual punishment,” see id at 1437, rather than merely undesirable or ineffective.  Additionally, like Brigham, 
Morton does not engage in any sustained textual, historical, or structural analysis of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.
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II.  THEORIES OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
What is known as the Supreme Court’s “Eighth Amendment” jurisprudence is really an 
amalgam of jurisprudence of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, since most of the decisional 
law has come from the States.53 To understand the jurisprudence in this area, we must first take a 
brief look at the Eighth Amendment’s text and its history.
A. A Word (or Two) About the Text
Our starting point, of course, is the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  As 
Justice Scalia has noted, for a punishment to violate the Clause, it must be both “cruel and
unusual.”54  After all, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, “five State Constitutions 
prohibited cruel or unusual punishments,’ and two prohibited cruel’ punishments.”55  Had the 
framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment meant it to prohibit anything less than punishments 
that were both cruel and unusual, they knew how to do so.  Yet cruelty is not a difficult threshold to 
meet.  At the time the Clause’s direct ancestor, the English Bill of Rights,56 was written, “the word 
cruel’ . . . simply meant severe or hard.”57  Thus, a sentence of death or of a lengthy term of 
imprisonment at hard labor might be cruel but, as Tom Jones might say, it’s not unusual.58
53 See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights 
and Criminal Procedure, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 145, 162 (2001) (“[M]ost of what we know or think we know about the 
Bill of Rights guarantees has been produced by cases in which the Court is interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”).
54 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (plurality) (“[A] disproportionate punishment can 
perhaps always be considered cruel,’ but it will not always be (as the text also requires) unusual.’”).
55 Id. at 966 (plurality) (emphasis added).  See also id. at 984-85 (distinguishing State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 
1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892), on ground that state constitutional provision there prohibited punishments “that were 
merely cruel’”).  But see John L. Bowers, Jr., & J.L. Boren, Jr., The Constitutional Prohibition Against Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment – Its Present Significance, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 680, 681 n.1 (1951) (“Apparently, no significance 
attaches to these variations; cruel is the key word in all.”).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 62 to 63.
57 Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:”  The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. 
Rev. 839, 860 (1969).
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But it is not enough that a punishment be both unusual and severe (cruel).  For example, 
granted that death is a severe, and therefore cruel, punishment, a novel method of execution, never 
before attempted, and therefore unusual, might on that account be considered both “cruel” and 
“unusual.”  However, the Supreme Court rejected this very argument, albeit in dicta, in In re 
Kemmler, writing that the electric chair, though unusual in 1890 because novel, did not render death 
by electrocution cruel and unusual, because the method of execution was adopted to make the 
process more, not less, humane.59  Rather, “[u]nusual’ is probably best thought of as adverbially 
modifying cruel.’” 60 That is, the Clause forbids extreme distinctness of punishment in the direction 
of greater, but not lesser, cruelty.61
But the text of the Amendment can take us only thus far.  History must be our next guide.
B. Origins of the Eighth Amendment
It is widely accepted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause derives directly from 
section 9 of the 1776Virginia Declaration of Rights, which in turn was derived from the 1689 
English Bill of Rights.62  Indeed, except for the fact that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
58 See Tom Jones, “It’s Not Unusual,” on Along Came Jones (Decca Records 1965).
59 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive 
Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 637 (1966) (“[T]he novelty of a punishment – the mere fact that it is unusual,’ 
without any excessive cruelty – does not suffice to prohibit it constitutionally.”).
60 Note, supra note 59, at 638 n.16.
61 See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 149
(2004) (defining “cruel and unusual” as “depart[ure] from precedent without morally sufficient reason in the 
direction of greater severity”).
62 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (plurality); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 n.10 
(1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); see also Chris Baniszewski, Comment, Supreme Court 
Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Requirement, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 930 
(1993); Granucci, supra note 57, at 852-53; William Hughes Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The 
Proportionality Rule, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 640 (1979); Note, supra note 59, at 636; Malcolm E. Wheeler, 
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 838, 839 
(1972).
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contains the mandatory “shall” rather than the precatory “ought,” it is a verbatim replica of the same 
clause in the English Bill.63  Thus, it is universally recognized that the history surrounding the 
enactment of the English Bill is relevant to a complete understanding of our own Eighth 
Amendment.64
It is generally believed that the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the English
Bill was prompted by one or both of two episodes in English history, both involving Lord Chief 
Justice Jeffreys who served on the King’s Bench during the reign of James II, the last of the Stuart
kings.65  First, following an unsuccessful rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth in 1685, “a special 
commission led by Jeffreys tried, convicted, and executed hundreds of suspected insurgents.”66  The 
commission practiced the traditional method of execution for traitors:  drawing the condemned man 
to the gallows on a cart; hanging by the neck; cutting down the prisoner before death ensues; 
disemboweling the prisoner while still alive and burning his entrails; beheading; and quartering the 
63 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966 (plurality); Bowers & Boren, supra note 55, at 682; Neil H. Cogan, The 
Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins  617 (1997); Granucci, supra note 57, at 853;
Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William 
Rummel, 71 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 378, 378 (1980); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, the 
Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States
Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buff. L. Rev. 783, 788 n.11 (1974).
64 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967 (plurality).
65 See id.; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 
Harv. L. Rev. 54, 55 (1910).
66 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at 
853; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.
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body.67  Female traitors were burned at the stake.68  The proceedings came to be known as the 
“Bloody Assizes.”69
The second episode involved Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric.  In 1679, Oates testified 
against a number of “prominent Catholics for allegedly organizing a Popish Plot’ to overthrow King 
Charles II.”70  The defendants were convicted and executed.71  It was later discovered that Oates was 
an inveterate liar who had perjured himself, leading to the execution of at least fifteen innocent 
men.72  Oates was tried for perjury and convicted in 1685.73  At sentencing, Jeffreys deemed it 
unfortunate that the death penalty could no longer be imposed for perjury,74 but asserted that “crimes 
of this nature are left to be punished according to the discretion of the court, so far as that the 
judgment extend not to life or member.”75 The court sentenced Oates to pay a fine of 2,000 marks, 
to be defrocked, to be pilloried four times annually, to be whipped “from Aldgate to Newgate’” on 
67 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at 
854; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.
68 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Granucci, supra note 57, at 853.
69 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at 
853; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.
70 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136; 
Granucci, supra note 57, at 856-57; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640-41; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
71 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136; 
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 641.
72 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136; 
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 641; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
73 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Granucci, supra note 57, at 
857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640-41.
74 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 137; 
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857-58.
75 Claus, supra note 61, at 137.
17
May 20, to be whipped “from Newgate to Tyburn’” on May 22, and to life imprisonment.76
Apparently, Jeffreys believed this to be the equivalent of a death sentence, for he did not expect 
Oates to survive the whipping.77
He was wrong.  After the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689, Oates asked the 
Parliament to set aside his sentence as contrary to the provisions of the Bill.78  Although the Lords 
refused to disturb the sentence,79 a minority dissented and issued a statement opining that Oates’ 
punishment was contrary to the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Bill.80 Oates then 
persuaded the House of Commons to pass a bill annulling the sentence, but the Commons was 
unsuccessful in getting the Lords to change their position.81  However, the Commons issued a report 
echoing the sentiments of the dissenting Lords, explaining why the Oates punishment was “cruel and 
unusual” in violation of the English Bill.82
Of course, the most important evidence regarding the term “cruel and unusual 
punishment” must come from those who framed and ratified the Eighth Amendment.83
Unfortunately, the history surrounding the adoption of the Amendment is sparse.  It appears that 
Congressional debate on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was limited to one relatively 
76 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 137; 
Granucci, supra note 57, at 858; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
77 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality).
78 See id.; Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 139; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
79 See Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 140.
80 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933-34; Claus, supra note 61, at 
140-41; Granucci, supra note 57, at 858; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
81 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (plurality); Claus, supra note 61, at 139; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
82 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 972 (plurality); Claus, supra note 61, at 142-43 n.107.
83 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975 (plurality) (“[T]he ultimate question is not what cruell and unusuall 
punishments” meant in the Declaration of Rights, but what its meaning was to the Americans who adopted the 
Eighth Amendment.”).
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unenlightening exchange.84  To find any helpful discussion of the concept of cruel and unusual 
punishments, one must go back to two State ratifying conventions held to debate the ratification of 
the Constitution.  In Massachusetts, delegate Abraham Holmes complained:
Congress [would be] possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories 
little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the 
disgrace of Christendom:  I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances 
is . . . that Congress [is] nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and 
unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no 
constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most 
mild instruments of their discipline.85
In Virginia, contrasting the Constitution with the State’s own Bill of Rights, delegate 
George Mason noted that “torture was included in the prohibition” of the “clause of the [Virginia] 
bill of rights provid[ing] that no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted.”86 The next day, 
delegate Patrick Henry expressed his trust in the Nation’s officials in defining crimes but not in 
prescribing the punishments for them:
Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into the business of human 
legislation.  They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest 
offence – petty larceny.  They may define crimes and prescribe punishments.  In 
the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives 
ought to be governed by.  But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought 
to be left, nor dependence put on the virtues of representatives.  . . .
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will lose the 
restriction of not . . .  inflicting cruel and unusual punishments.  These are 
prohibited by your declaration of rights.  What has distinguished our ancestors? –
That they would not admit of tortures or cruel and barbarous punishment.  But 
84 See Cogan, supra note 63, at 618; see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910); Claus, supra note 61, at 128; Granucci, supra note 57, at 842; Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 705 (2005).
85 2 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 111 
(2d ed. 1881); see also Claus, supra note 61, at 130; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841.
86 3 J. Elliot, supra note 85, at 451-52; see also Claus, supra note 61, at 131; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841-
42.
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Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the 
common law.  They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany –
of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.  They will say that they might as 
well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell 
you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that 
they must have a criminal equity, and extort confessions by torture, in order to 
punish with still more relentless severity.87
Running through these American and British pre-enactment statements are several themes 
that have re-appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
A number of substantive88 principles can be drawn from the Eighth Amendment case law.  
First, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits judges from imposing punishments that 
are not authorized by statute.  Second, it prohibits the legislature from authorizing certain modes of 
punishment. Third, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of punishments that are grossly 
disproportionate to the crime committed.  And, finally, the Eighth Amendment categorically bars the 
death penalty for certain classes of offenses and offenders.89
87 3 J. Elliot, supra note 85, at 447-48) ; see also Claus, supra note 61, at 131; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841 
n.10.
88 I say “substantive” to distinguish these principles from the specialized procedural guidelines the Court has 
established in death penalty cases beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976), and Gregg’s companion cases.  See Lee, supra note 84, at 725 (distinguishing Court’s 
“substantive” from “procedural” death penalty jurisprudence).  In the simplest of terms, those specialized procedures 
are designed to further the twin (and some say irreconcilable) goals of (1) eliminating arbitrariness in capital 
sentencing and (2) ensuring individualized treatment of the capital defendant.  See Linda E. Carter & Ellen 
Kreitzberg, Understanding Capital Punishment Law § 13.06, at 178-81 (2004).  Arguably, these two lines of cases, 
given that they address procedural requirements, are not Eighth Amendment cases at all but are pure “due process” 
cases that prescribe the process that is due when life – the predominant value in the “life, liberty, or property” 
hierarchy – is on the line.  See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:  Super 
Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980).
89 The Court has also held that “the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposes substantive limits on 
what can be made criminal and punished as such.”  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).  The Court has 
applied this limitation in only a single case, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), in which the Court 
held that it violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
for California to make narcotics addiction a criminal offense.  The Court made clear that it was not the possible 
sentence – 90 days in jail – that was unconstitutional but the fact that the State had made such a status criminal at all:  
“Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime’ of having a common cold.” Id.
20
1. Prohibitions on Severe Punishment Not Authorized by Law
The core, uncontroversial protection provided by the Eighth Amendment is that severe 
punishments that are unauthorized by law are forbidden.  Referring to Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys’ 
role in both the Bloody Assizes and the Titus Oates affair, Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality in 
Harmelin v. Michigan that “Jeffreys was widely accused of inventing’ special penalties for the 
King’s enemies . . . that were not authorized by common-law precedent or by statute.”90  Justice 
Scalia also relied on many of the statements from the House of Commons report and the dissenters 
in the House of Lords regarding the Titus Oates case to shore up this conclusion.  The Commons 
report had noted, for example, that “there [was] no express Law to warrant” life imprisonment for 
Oates, and that Jeffreys and his colleagues had made a “Pretence to a discretionary Power” that did 
not exist in the law.91 For their part, the dissenting Lords had noted that for King’s Bench to defrock 
Accord id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from 
convicting the addict of a crime.”). 
However, as Herbert Packer recognized shortly after Robinson was decided – and surprisingly few have 
acknowledged since – Robinson is not really an Eighth Amendment decision at all but one that sounds purely in due 
process:
Robinson v. California may have established in the eighth amendment a basis for invalidating 
legislation that is thought inappropriately to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack 
of precedent  for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not because of its mode or 
even its proportion but because the conduct for which it is imposed should not be subjected to 
the criminal sanction.
Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1071 (1964) (footnote omitted).
See also Mulligan, supra note 62, at 644 (“[W]hether a certain act should be a crime and whether the punishment 
should fit the crime are entirely separate inquiries.”); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 802  (“It is 
questionable whether Robinson really presented an eighth amendment issue.  [T]he application of the eighth 
amendment to the nature of the conduct made criminal, instead of the method or kind of punishment, represented a 
unique use of the amendment’s protections.”).
90 501 U.S. 957, 968 (1991) (plurality).
91 Id. at 973 (plurality).
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Oates was “wholly out of their Power, belonging to the Ecclesiastical Courts only,” and that the 
sentence was “contrary to Law and ancient Practice.”92
Justice Scalia deduced from this that the “requirement that punishment not be unusuall’ . . 
. was primarily a requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of 
common-law tradition.” 93 However, “[d]epartures from the common law were lawful . . . if 
authorized by statute.” 94  In short, he concluded, “a punishment is cruel and unusual’ if it is illegal 
because not sanctioned by common law or statute.”95
Justice Scalia recognized, however, that the Clause could not be wrenched from its British 
roots and simply re-planted in American soil.  Merely limiting judges to the imposition of 
punishments authorized by statute or common law made sense in Great Britain, with its notion of 
legislative supremacy.  The Eighth Amendment, however, was meant also, even primarily, as a 
check upon the Legislature.96 Therefore, the Clause must mean something more.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 974 (plurality); accord Claus, supra note 61, at 121 (“In adopting the 1689 Bill of Rights, the English 
Parliament sought to condemn punishments that were illegal because they were contrary to the common law . . . in 
the direction of greater severity.”).
94 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (plurality).
95 Id. at 984 n.10 (plurality); see also Claus, supra note 61, at 136 (asserting that the “core concern” of those 
who drafted the English cruel and unusual punishments clause “was illegality, that is, violation of the common law 
or existing statutes”); Granucci, supra note 57, at 859 (“In the context of Oates’ case, cruel and unusual’ seems to 
have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.”); 
Wheeler, supra note 62, at 855 (“[O]ne of the two recognized purposes of the original language of [the English Bill] 
was to prevent the judiciary from exceeding its authority in punishing criminals.”).
96 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975-76 (plurality); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977) 
(“Americans . . . feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments not only by judges acting beyond their 
lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be 
measured.  Indeed, the principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative 
definition of crimes and punishments.”); Claus, supra note 61, at 146 (“The American founders adopted the 
punishments’ prohibition of the English Bill of Rights as a limitation on the power of the new federal government, 
without specifying to which branch or branches of that government the limitations applied.”); Mulligan, supra note 
62, at 639 (“The . . . restriction binds both the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government . . . .”).
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2. Prohibitions on Unduly Severe Modes of Punishment
The second uncontroversial proposition in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of certain m odes of punishment.
Justice Scalia set forth this interpretation in his plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.97  Since, 
in the context of American constitutionalism, “unusual” could not mean only unauthorized by 
positive law, it must be given its other typical meaning:  “[s]uch as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary 
practice.’”98  Accordingly, “the Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 
modes’ of punishment – specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or 
customarily employed.”99
This view is supported by the statements of those who voiced support for the addition of a 
cruel and unusual punishments clause to the Constitution.100 George Mason observed that the 
Virginia version of the Clause prohibited “torture.”101 Abraham Holmes feared that without such a 
clause, Congress could introduce the “rack[] and [the] gibbet[].”102  And Patrick Henry warned that 
97 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality).
98 Id. at 976 (plurality) (quoting Webster’s American Dictionary (1828)) (alterations in original).
99 Id.; accord Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 85, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality) (“If the word unusual’ is to have any 
meaning apart from the word cruel’ . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different 
from that which is generally done.”); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (“[T]he Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause . . . limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes . . 
. .”); Claus, supra note 61, at 123 (arguing that the Clause “condemn[s] punishments unknown to the common law 
for the offense of conviction”); Lee, supra note 84, at 705 (“[T]here has been no disagreement on the proposition 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits [certain modes of punishment].”); Note, supra note 59, at 637 (“[T]he word 
unusual’ . . . at least normally suggests that the provision is not intended to prohibit punishments that have been 
commonly authorized or imposed.”).
100 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979-80 (plurality); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 382 (“[W]hat little evidence there 
is clearly centers around a concern to prevent the national government from initiating barbarous methods of 
punishment.”).
101 See supra text accompanying note 86.
102 See supra text accompanying note 85; 
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without an express prohibition, Congress could establish “tortures or cruel and barbarous 
punishment” such as that practiced by “the civil law” regimes in “France, Spain, and Germany.”103
This interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has manifested itself in 
two ways.  First, the Clause “forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of [a] death 
sentence.”104  Thus, the Court has continually upheld the death penalty against the charge that it is 
cruel and unusual, and has noted that “something more than the mere extinguishment of life,” such 
as “torture or a lingering death,” must be present to render execution cruel and unusual.105  Though 
the Court has not had occasion to rule that various methods of execution violate the Clause, it has 
written in dicta that the traditional English punishment for treason106 is forbidden,107 as are “burning 
at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, [and] the like.”108
103 Se supra text accompanying note 87.  Granucci, supra note 57, at 860 -65, argues that this view by Henry, 
Holmes, and Mason was based on the erroneous belief that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English 
Bill also prohibited certain modes of punishment.  Granucci’s argument that the English Bill did not proscribe 
particular modes of punishment is persuasive.  First, the gruesome methods of execution of female and male traitors 
utilized by the Bloody Assizes continued in use until 1790 and 1814, respectively, more than a century after the Bill 
was enacted.  See id. at 855-56.  In addition, each of the methods of punishment used against Titus Oates also was 
continued in use for some times afterward – whipping until 1948.  See id. at 859.  It is also noteworthy that neither 
the report of the House of Commons nor the statement of the dissenters in the House of Lords intimates that Oates’ 
punishment was illegal because of the methods used.  But see Note, supra note 59, at 637 (asserting that “it was the 
unusual cruelty in the method of punishment that was condemned” by the English Bill).  Nonetheless, it seems 
immaterial whether the framers’ intended use of the words “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment 
conformed to a correct or an erroneous interpretation of the same words in another document; all that matters is the 
meaning they intended.  See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 380 (“[S]ince Granucci admits that the American framers 
originally intended to prohibit cruel methods of punishment, one must question the relevance of his two proposed 
English meanings, even assuming they are correct.”).
104 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality)
105 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (dicta).  
106 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
107 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (dicta) (“[P]unishments of torture . . . and all others in the 
same line of unnecessary cruelty [as were practiced by the Stuart Kings] are forbidden by [the Eighth] 
[A]mendment.”).
108 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446 (dicta); accord Bowers & Boren, supra note 55, at 685 (observing that the Clause 
prohibits “torturous and barbarous punishments [such] as drawing and quartering, disemboweling, stretching on the 
rack, breaking on the wheel, and burning alive”).  
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Second, certain types of non-capital punishments are forbidden.  For example, in Weems 
v. United States, the defendant was convicted of making a false entry in a public document with 
intent to defraud the government.109  He was sentenced to:  (1) 15 years of cadena temporal, a form 
of punishment encompassing “hard and painful labor” while “carry[ing] a chain at the ankle, 
hanging from the wrist”; (2) civil interdiction, depriving him “of the rights of parental authority, 
guardianship of person or property, participation in the family council, marital authority, [and] the 
right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos”; (3) “perpetual absolute disqualification” 
from voting or holding public office; and (4) lifetime surveillance by the authorities, including the 
inability to move his domicile without permission and the requirement that he make himself and his 
home available for inspection.110  The Court held this sentence to violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.111
Weems is extraordinarily significant, for at least two reasons.  First, the Court rejected the 
idea that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was static, instead adopting a dynamic view of 
the Clause:  “[G]eneral language should not . . . be necessarily confined to the form that evil had 
theretofore taken.  Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave 
it birth.”112  Second, the Weems Court introduced the notion of “intra-jurisdictional analysis,” i.e., a 
comparison of the punishment for the crime in question with punishments for other crimes within the 
109 217 U.S. 349, 357 (1910).
110 Id. at 363-65.
111 See id. at 377.
112 Id. at 373; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s 
proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789.”); Mulligan, supra note 62, 
at 644 (noting that Weems stands for the proposition “that the eighth amendment prohibition is evolutionary in 
nature”).
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same jurisdiction.113  In Weems, the Court concluded that the punishment was too severe because, 
first, more serious crimes were punished just as severely,114 and, second, comparable crimes were 
treated less severely.115
Likewise, in Trop v. Dulles, a plurality of the Court determined that loss of citizenship for 
a native-born citizen was cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of wartime desertion.116 Trop
reaffirmed both significant aspects of the Weems methodology.  First, the Court reiterated that the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment was not frozen in time in 1791, but that “[t]he Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”117  Second, the Court performed a type of comparative analysis, this one inter-jurisdictional 
in nature, noting that “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness 
is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime,” and that “only . . . the Philippines and Turkey[] 
impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”118
113 See Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 799.
114 Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81 (noting that punishment was same for “forgery of or counterfeiting the 
obligations or securities of the United States[,] a crime which may cause the loss of many thousands of dollars”); see 
also id. at 380 (noting that several “degrees of homicide, . . . misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to 
destroy the government by force, recruiting soldiers in the United States to fight against the Unites States, forgery of 
letters patent, forgery of bonds and other instruments for the purpose of defrauding the United States, robbery, [and] 
larceny” were each punished less severely).
115 See id. (noting that embezzlement, which was “similar[] to the offense for which Weems was convicted,” 
was punishable only by two years imprisonment, with none of the “accessories” of the cadena temporal).
116 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality).  Justice Brennan concurred on the ground that denationalization for 
wartime desertion was “beyond the power of Congress” because there was no rational relation between Congress’ 
power to wage war and a blanket rule stripping the citizenship of any and all wartime deserters.  See id. at 113-14 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  Rather, the motive seemed to him to be “naked vengeance,” an improper legislative 
purpose.  See id. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 101 (plurality).
118 Id. at 102-03 (plurality).
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3. Prohibitions on Disproportionate Punishment
The Court has also recognized another, more controversial proposition:  that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits punishments that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.  The currently 
operative exposition of this principle appears in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin v. 
Michigan.119  The analysis proceeds in two parts.  First, a court must ask whether “a threshold 
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”120  If such an inference is raised, then the court undertakes “intrajurisdictional 
and interjurisdictional analyses,” i.e., “a comparative analysis between [the] sentence [at issue] and 
sentences imposed for other crimes in [the same jurisdiction] and sentences imposed for the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”121  These last two steps purport to “circumscribe federal judicial 
subjectivity by relying on objective data from the state legislatures.”122
For example, in Solem v. Helm, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory prison term 
of life without parole for attempting to use a $100 check drawn on a non-existent account, after 
119 501 U.S. 957, 1001-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Because 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest grounds in Harmelin, his separate opinion has been treated 
as controlling.  See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (plurality); Lee, supra note 84, at 693 (noting 
that Justice Kennedy’s “opinion . . . eventually came to assume the status of law”).
120 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983); Lee, supra note 84, at 693-94.
121 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (plurality); Solem, 463 U.S. at 291; O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., 
dissenting) (noting that defendant received heavier prison term for selling liquor than he could have received for 
“burglary or highway robbery”); Lee, supra note 84, at 693-94, 731.  Cf. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890) 
(opining that Equal Protection Clause “requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one 
than is imposed upon all for like offenses”).  When the Court initially established this standard in Solem, 463 U.S. at 
292, it set forth these three factors as a non-exhaustive list of “objective criteria” for courts to consider.  Justice 
Kennedy altered this standard in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), by declaring that “intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case 
in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”
122 Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal 
Sentence: Following the Supreme Court “From Precedent to Precedent,” 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 25, 56 (1985).
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having previously been convicted of six non -violent felonies.123 The Court determined that Helm’s 
punishment, at first glance, seemed disproportionate to his crime.124  The Court then performed an 
intrajurisdictional analysis and found both that “Helm ha[d] been treated in the same manner as, or 
more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes,” and that it appeared 
that Helm was the only individual South Dakota had punished as severely for comparable crimes.125
Finally, the Court found “that Helm was treated more seve rely than he would have been in any other 
State”:  only Nevada provided for a comparable sentence for Helm’s crime, but even there, such a 
sentence was merely authorized, not mandated, and it appeared that no one similar to Helm in 
material respects had ever received such a sentence.126  The Court concluded that Helm’s sentence 
was constitutionally disproportionate to his crime.127
The notion that the Eighth Amendment contains a proscription against disproportionate 
punishments has engendered much controversy, both on and off the Court.  Aside from textual and 
historical arguments,128 detractors of this theory have substantial pragmatic grounds to dispute it.  
They argue that the standards established by the Court to determine whether a punishment is 
123 463 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1983).
124 See id. at 296-97.
125 Id. at 299.
126 Id. at 299-300.
127 See id. at 303.
128 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (plurality) (“[T]o use the phrase cruel and 
unusual punishments’ to describe a requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and 
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying more directly.”); id. at 978 n.9 (plurality) 
(“If cruel and unusual punishments’ included disproportionate punishments, the separate prohibition of 
disproportionate fines (which are certainly punishments) would have been entirely superfluous.”); id. at 979 
(plurality) (pointing out that all of the statements made surrounding adoption of Eighth Amendment discuss only 
forbidden modes of punishment and none indicates an intention to proscribe disproportionate punishments); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378-82 (same).  Because the rule espoused by this Article ultimately does not depend on 
an Eighth Amendment disproportionality principle, a more complete analysis of these textual and historical 
arguments is beyond the Article’s scope.
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disproportionate to the offense “seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an 
invitation to imposition of subjective values.”129  Regarding the threshold issue, the gravity of the 
crime, there simply is no objective way to measure “gravity.”130 It is true that some general 
objective principles regarding the relative gravity of offenses can be formulated.131  For example, 
the magnitude of different degrees of the exact same type of harm can be reliably measured;
intentional conduct is universally recognized as more serious than negligent conduct; lesser 
included offenses are generally less serious than the greater offense; and “attempts are less serious 
than completed crimes.”132 However, beyond these few guideposts, judges are largely at sea in 
evaluating the relative gravity of crimes.  Is intentionally selling cocaine worse than intentionally 
embezzling a million dollars?  And how should we treat a lesser mental state attendant to a greater 
harm as compared with the reverse?  That is, is intentionally cutting off another person’s pinky toe 
worse than recklessly blinding her or negligently killing her?  Moreover, the state might emphasize 
deterrence, which depends not just on the severity of the punishment but also, among other things,
on its certainty.133  Depending on the particular crimes at issue, the perpetrator of the intuitively 
129 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 (plurality); see also Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 958-59 (“[T]he Helm test 
gives judges too much discretion to impose their subjective values into sentencing.”).
130 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987-88 (plurality); Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 69 (“Ascertaining the 
gravity of the offense is very problematical.”); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 959 (“[A] threshold comparison’ of 
the crime with the punishment . . . gives judges too much discretion in determining the gravity of the offense and 
harshness of the penalty.”); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, 
and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880, 888 (2004);  (“Surely the seriousness of an offense is not a 
universal, timeless fact.”); Mulligan, supra note 62, at 646 (“The first prong of the test requires the court to make a 
judgment as to the seriousness of the crime charged and this of course invites the substitution of the subjective views 
of the judge for those of the legislature.”).
131 See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 304 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case, we can 
identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of 
judicial subjectivity.”).
132 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983).
133 See Harmelin, 501 U.S.  989 (plurality) (“[D]eterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the 
penalty but upon its certainty.”); Lee, supra note 84, at 738 (“[T]he less certain the punishment is, the more severe it 
needs to be to sufficiently deter potential criminals.”).
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“lesser” crime might be so likely to escape capture that those who are brought to justice must be 
dealt with more severely than those who commit the intuitively “greater” crime in order for the 
punishment to have the desired deterrent effect,134 even assuming we can objectively differentiate 
the lesser from the greater in the first place. Intra-jurisdictional analysis, comparison of 
punishments for different crimes within the same jurisdiction, suffers from the same problem:  “One 
cannot compare the sentences imposed by the jurisdiction for similarly grave’ offenses if there is 
no objective standard of gravity.”135
At the same time, difficulties in applying a proportionality principle cannot justify the 
courts’ failure to enforce such a principle, assuming its existence is a justifiable conclusion from text 
and history.136 Yet those who insist that the Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality 
principle find it difficult if not impossible to articulate a truly objective methodology for translating 
that principle into law.137 The choice, then, seems to be between the courts’ abdication of their 
responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment or their imposition of their own subjective views.138
134 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989 (plurality) (“[C]rimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to 
detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.”); Karlan, supra note 130, at 895 (similar); Wheeler, supra note 
62, at 851-52 (“Some crimes cause little mischief but are more difficult to detect than more mischievous ones. . . .  It 
could therefore be argued that a severe penalty must be imposed for those few who are caught doing the proscribed 
act . . . .”).
135 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988 (plurality); see also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282 n.27 (“Other crimes . . . implicate 
other societal interests, making any such comparison inherently speculative.”); Mulligan, supra note 62, at 647 
(“The problem of determining the gravity of a particular crime is difficult enough without having to make judgments 
about other crimes.”).
136 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 383 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A] general principle of deference 
surely cannot justify the complete abdication of our responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”); Lee, supra 
note 84, at 745 (“[T]he truism that legislatures get to decide amounts of punishment is no reason for the Court to 
evade its responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”).
137 See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 59 (“The . . . demand for complete objectivity cannot be 
satisfied.”).
138 See Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1136 (1979); see also Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 951 (“[T]he Court has not been able to develop an objective 
approach or to strike a proper balance between the courts’ power of review and the legislatures’ initial power to 
determine prison sentences.”).
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Although using only the inter-jurisdictional analysis is one potential solution, 139 that analysis has 
pitfalls of its own, as will be demonstrated in the next section. As a result, the compromise reached 
by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, and currently the law, recognizes a proportionality principle in the 
Eighth Amendment but one which it is nearly impossible for the state not to satisfy.
4. Categorical Bars to the Death Penalty
The final principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court is that the death penalty cannot be imposed on certain types of offenders or for 
certain classes of crimes.  Though similar to the proportionality principle, the objective line between 
death and all other punishments has allowed the Court to treat this area as a self-contained sphere of 
jurisprudence.140 Pursuant to this line of jurisprudence, the death penalty cannot be imposed for 
most offenses not resulting in death,141 or for felony murder where the d efendant does not himself
kill, and does not at least display reckless disregard for human life and play a major role in the 
139 See Gilchrist, supra note 138, at 1136 (opining that courts “must look to the judgments of many legislatures 
for an approximation of current norms of proportional punishment for the crime in question”).
140 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (plurality) (“[T]his line of authority [i]s an aspect of 
[the Court’s] death penalty jurisprudence, rather than as a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law.”); Hutto, 
454 U.S. at 373 (“[W]e distinguish[] between punishments – such as the death penalty – which by their very nature 
differ from all other forms of punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration.”); Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Because a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment . 
. . our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance . 
. . .”).
141 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality); id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (opining that death penalty is always “cruel and unusual”); id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(same); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721.  A broad reading of Coker leads to the conclusion that the death penalty 
is barred for any crime unless death results, while, pursuant to a narrower reading, the death penalty is still 
permissible for some non-homicidal conduct.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996) (“The 
[Coker] plurality took great pains in referring only to the rape of adult women throughout their opinion, leaving 
open the question of the rape of a child.”) (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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underlying crime.142  In addition, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the mentally retarded143 or 
on those who killed before reaching the age of eighteen years.144
The methodology used in these “categorical bar” cases is similar to that used in the non-
capital disproportionality cases.145  Again, the Court has developed a two-part test.  First, the Court 
looks to objective evidence,146 by conducting an inter-jurisdictional analysis looking primarily147 to 
how many jurisdictions authorize capital punishment to one in the offender’s position,148 and 
142 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787-88 (1982); see also 
Lee, supra note 84, at 721.
143 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721..
144 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, (2005); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721.  In addition, the Court 
has held that the Constitution forbids execution of the insane.  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 
(1986).  This differs somewhat from the “categorical bar” cases, for each of those addresses constraints on the 
ability of governments to impose the sentence, while Ford constrains only their ability to execute the sentence.  
However, the methodology used by the Ford Court to reach this conclusion was consistent with the methodology 
used in the “categorical bar” cases.
145 See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 58-59 (noting similarity between the two tests).
146 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“Proportionality review . . . should be informed by objective factors to the 
maximum extent possible.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“[W]e 
have looked to objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today.”); Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 
(“[T]his Court takes into account objective evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a particular 
punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment protects.”).
147 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as 
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”) (emphasis added); 
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (“The clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted 
by the country’s legislatures.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[T]he decisions of American legislatures . . . about the minimum age at which a juvenile’s crimes may 
lead to capital punishment . . . should provide the most reliable signs of a society-wide consensus on this issue.”); 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987) (“[W]e find the state legislatures’ judgment as to proportionality in these 
circumstances relevant to th[e] constitutional inquiry.”)
148 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (finding that 20 States allow execution for crime committed while under age 
of eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (finding that 20 States allow execution of mentally retarded); Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (finding that 25 states permitted execution of seventeen year-old offenders 
and 22 permitted execution of sixteen year-old offenders); Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (finding that 34 states permitted 
execution of mentally retarded); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 (plurality) (finding that of “the 18 States that have 
expressly established a minimum age in their death-penalty statutes . . . all of them require that the defendant have 
attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense”); Tison, 481 U.S. at 154 (“[O]nly 11 States 
authorizing capital punishment forbid imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in 
the felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise an inference of extreme 
recklessness.”); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (“[N]o State in the Union permits the execution of the insane.”); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (“[O]nly eighth jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for 
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secondarily to how often, where authorized, juries impose the punishment under like 
circumstances.149 The Court has also performed an intra-jurisdictional analysis in some cases by 
looking to the judgments of juries within the jurisdiction in question.150 The objective approach is 
required in part by the Eighth Amendment’s text, which, again, forbids “only those punishments that 
are both cruel and unusual,’”151 and in part by the requirement of deference to legislative judgments 
in “our federal system.”152
Second, the Court uses a more subjective analysis,153 bringing its “own judgment . . . to 
bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”154
participation in a robbery in which another robber takes a life.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) 
(plurality) (finding that only one jurisdiction authorized capital punishment for rape of adult woman).  Beginning in 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16, the Court also:  looked to “the consistency and direction of change” among jurisdictions 
in limiting the death penalty to certain offenses and offenders; considered how “overwhelmingly” such limitations 
have been approved; and took into account “the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than 
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime.”  See also Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1193. In some 
cases, the inter-jurisdictional analysis has taken into account non-American, and even non-common-law, 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., id. at 1198-1200.
149 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (“[E]ven in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, 
the practice is infrequent.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (“[E]ven in those States that allow the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon.”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (finding that only three of 796 then-
current death row prisoners “did not participate in the fatal assault on the victim” and neither “hired [n]or solicited 
someone else to kill the victim [n]or participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim”).  The Court in Stanford, 
492 U.S. at 374, warned that care should be taken in relying too heavily on this factor, since “the very considerations 
which induce [some] to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and 
juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed.”
150 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (finding that, of the “[f]orty-five felony murderers . . . currently on 
[Florida’s] death row,” only one – petitioner – neither killed nor intended to kill); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality) 
(finding that 90% of Georgia juries rejected capital punishment for rapists).
151 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70 (emphasis in Stanford); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7 (plurality) 
(“[C]ontemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of legislatures and juries, provide an important measure of 
whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual’ [in part because] whether an action is unusual’ depends, in 
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its acceptance.”).
152 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70.
153 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“[T]he objective evidence, though of great importance, d[oes] not wholly 
determine’ the controversy.”) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality)).
154 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality).  Accord Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1192 (2005); Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 313; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (plurality); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Lee, supra note 84, at 189.
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Here, the Court looks at the culpability of the defendant and the harm he has caused, in comparison 
to the typical first-degree murderer.  If the defendant is less culpable or caused less harm than the 
typical first-degree murderer, then death is a disproportionate punishment because not even all first-
degree murderers are deserving of the death penalty.155 In an overlapping, sometimes 
indistinguishable, inquiry, the Court asks whether, in light of the defendant’s level of culpability, his 
execution would meaningfully advance – that is, advance by some meaningful increment beyond 
what would be achieved by imposition of a lesser sentence –either of the accepted goals of capital 
punishment, retribution and deterrence.156  If not, then imposition of the death penalty “is nothing 
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment.157
Like the Court’s disproportionality analysis, its categorical bar methodology has its 
detractors both on and off the Court.  The subjective portion of the analysis, predictably, has been 
dismissed as merely a seat-of-the-pants determination based on nothing more than the personal 
preferences of a majority of the sitting Justices.158 Yet even the objective portion of the analysis is 
subject to criticism.  At first blush, the inter -jurisdictional analysis “can be applied with clarity and 
ease.”159  However, after the Court has added up the jurisdictions on either side of the ledger, it must 
155 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1195-96; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 
(plurality); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 155-58 (1987); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798; Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 
(plurality).  Accord Lee, supra note 84, at 689-90.
156 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1196-97; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Penry, 492 U.S. at 335; Thompson, 487 U.S. 
at 833 (plurality); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801; Lee, supra note 84, at 690.  In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21, the 
Court also looked to such indicia as: the opinions of professional organizations; the stance of religious groups; and 
public opinion data.
157 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality); accord Penry, 492 U.S. at 335; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
158 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (plurality) (“[T]o mean that . . . it is for us to 
judge . . . on the basis of what we think proportionate’ and measurably contributory to the acceptable goals of 
punishment’ . . . is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”).
159 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (plurality).
34
then decide how many jurisdictions must eschew capital punishment in a particular context before a 
national consensus has been reached.  Some cases, of course, are easier than others.  In Coker v. 
Georgia, the Court observed that Georgia was the only jurisdiction that authorized execution for the 
rape of an adult woman.160  But in two more recent cases, the Court held that there was a national 
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded and those who committed their crimes as 
juveniles, even though in each case only 60% of the States, and only 47% of the States with the 
death penalty, precluded its use in those contexts.161  This has led even some Justices in the majority 
in those cases to concede that such objective evidence is truly insufficient to demonstrate a national 
consensus, and that the subjective aspect of the test was really driving those decisions.162  In turn, 
this has opened the Court up to even more criticism that its categorical bar jurisprudence simply 
reflects the personal preferences of a majority of the Justices.163
160 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (plurality).
161 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1192 (2005) (finding that 20 of 38 death penalty States allow 
execution for crime committed while under age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) 
(finding that 20 of 38 death penalty States allow execution of mentally retarded).  Roper and Atkins brought to the 
surface a subsidiary debate within the Court:  whether to include non-death penalty States in the denominator when 
determining whether there is a national consensus.  Compare Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) 
(“[T]he Stanford Court should have considered those States that had abandoned the death penalty altogether as part 
of the consensus against the death penalty . . . .”) with id. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“None of our cases dealing 
with an alleged constitutional limitation upon the death penalty has counted, as States supporting a consensus in 
favor of that limitation, States that have eliminated the death penalty entirely.”) (emphasis omitted).
162 See, e.g., Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1212 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he objective evidence of national 
consensus, standing alone, was insufficient to dictate the Court’s holding in Atkins.”).  Justice O’Connor  had been 
in the majority in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
163 See, e.g., Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1221 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the real force driving today’s 
decision is not the actions of [the]state legislatures but the Court’s own judgment’ that murderers younger than 18 
can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal 
views of its Members.”).
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III.  THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT
All of the applications of the Eighth Amendment discussed above have at least one thing 
in common:  none distinguishes the Eighth Amendment in its pristine form from the Amendment as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Since 1962, when the Eighth Amendment was 
held to bind the States,164 both courts and commentators have assumed that the same Eighth 
Amendment standards – whatever those might be – apply in an identical fashion to the federal and 
State governments.165 Indeed, the two main cases applying the “pure” Eighth Amendment, Weems 
v. United States166 and Trop v. Dulles,167 have greatly influenced the development of “incorporated” 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, through their dynamic rather than static view of the Amendment 
and their use of comparative analysis among and within jurisdictions. Conventional wisdom thus 
holds that there is no “pure” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence distinct from the Court’s 
“incorporated” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, recent research reveals that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of 
Rights were adopted primarily to make it more difficult for the federal government to investigate, 
prosecute, convict, and punish people for crime, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.  
This function contrasts sharply with the reliability-enhancing rationale ascribed to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  This distinction suggests that the Bill of Rights applies more 
stringently to the federal government than it does to the States, a notion that makes perfect sense in 
light of the communitarian ideology of the Anti-Federalists, who insisted on the inclusion in the 
Constitution of the Bill of Rights.  After all, there is no more fundamental way in which citizens can 
164 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
165 But see Packer, supra note 89, at 1074 n.11 (briefly suggesting that different standards might apply).
166 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
167 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality).
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be excluded from their communities, literally or figuratively, than by subject ing them to the criminal 
sanction.  It is this potential power to exclude by the new central government that was among the 
most feared by the Anti-Federalists.  The Anti-Federalists’ desire to hobble the federal government’s 
power to re-shape local communities through federal criminal law extended naturally to the federal 
power to punish, for punishment, even upon a properly-obtained federal conviction, dictates the 
nature, length, and extent of a citizen’s exclusion from his community.
A. The Anti-Federalists and the Bill of Rights
We tend to think of the Bill of Rights as a charter of freedom that puts a thumb on the 
scale on the side of “the individual” against that abstraction known as “the state.”168  In this 
paradigm, it matters not whether “the state” is the local or the national government.  Both are equally 
capable of arbitrarily or maliciously taking our freedom, of reducing citizens to the status of mere 
subjects.  Indeed, for moderns, living in the aftermath of Jim Crow and the modern civil rights 
movement, it is near gospel that we have more to fear from local government than from the national
government.169
But what is orthodoxy now was heterodoxy in 1791.  The Anti-Federalists of that period 
“saw state legislatures and state courts as the protectors of citizens and not as threats.”170 What they 
feared was the newly created central government. George C. Thomas, III invites us back into time:
Return to the 1790s.  The States eye the central government, to which they have 
just ceded much of their sovereignty, as a potential bully or, worse, a tyrant.  The 
168 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights:  Creation and Reconstruction 34 (1998) (“[T]he conventional 
assumption [is] that virtually all the provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . were essentially designed to protect 
individual rights.”).
169 See id. at 4 (“[M]any lawyers embrace a tradition that views state governments as the quintessential threat 
to individual and minority rights, and federal officials – especially federal courts – as the special guardians of those 
rights”).
170 Thomas, supra note 53, at 180.
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States look upon the freshly minted central government as it looms above them, 
and it reminds them of King George III and Parliament.171
It is well known that the Constitution was ratified by many states on the implicit condition that a Bill 
of Rights be added shortly thereafter to assuage these fears.172  The underlying premises of the Anti-
Federalists, then, are critical to an understanding of the Bill of Rights, for without their assent, the 
Constitution might never have been ratified.173
Close scrutiny of the Anti-Federalists’ Bill of Rights reveals it to be profoundly concerned 
with preserving state sovereignty as a means of furthering liberty.  Though framed in terms of 
protecting the rights of individuals, the Bill of Rights was viewed in 1791 as a barrier between the 
States and the national government.174 While t o moderns, the Bill of Rights is counter-
majoritarian,175 to the ancients, exactly the opposite was true:  the Bill of Rights, as originally 
171 Id. at 149.  See also Calvin Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State 
Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1231 (asserting that the Bill of Rights is “a constitutional antidote to 
the potential excesses of national power so feared by the Anti-Federalists”).
172 See Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 66 
(1989) (“[R]atification of the Constitution was only secured because Federalists agreed to consider subsequent 
amendments recommended by Anti-Federalists in various state conventions.”); Massey, supra note 171, at 1236 
(“[T]he Anti-Federalist opposition [to the Constitution] shifted to a reluctant acceptance of the instrument provided 
that appropriate constitutional restraints were placed upon the powers of the federal government.’”) (quoting 
Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable 
Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1261, 1276 (1989)); Thomas, supra note 53, at 
157 (observing that Bill of Rights was added “to satisfy the anti-Federalists”).
173 See Cornell, supra note 172, at 67 (“Anti-Federalist intentions are relevant to understanding the 
Constitution; without their acquiescence ratification might never have been secured. * * * In particular, Anti-
Federalist political thought is essential to understanding the meaning of the Bill of Rights.”).  This is not to imply 
that Anti-Federalist theory was monolithic.  See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in 
1 Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist 5 (1981) (“It would be difficult to find a single point about which 
all of the Anti-Federalists agreed.”).  It is only to say that certain themes were heavily emphasized in Anti-Federalist 
thought.
174 See Thomas, supra note 53, at 149.  See also Massey, supra note 171, at 1231 (contending that the “Anti-
Federalist constitution’ [is] concerned with preserving the states as autonomous units of government and as 
structural bulwarks of human liberty”).
175 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1203 (1991) (“Today, the 
very phrase Bill of Rights’ is virtually synonymous with a compilation of countermajoritarian personal rights.”).
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conceived, was a stridently majoritarian document.176 The Bill was primarily concerned with 
lowering what Akhil Amar has dubbed the “agency costs” of representative democracy.177  The 
Anti-Federalists knew that because the number of the people’s representatives in the nation’s capital 
would be relatively small, only the aristocratic few, “with reputations over wide geographic areas,” 
would be well known enough to be elected.178  The Anti-Federalists feared that these aristocratic 
“representatives” would be truly un-representative, given their distance, both physical and psychic, 
from the “middling classes” that made up the mass of the people.179 The danger was that the 
people’s national representatives, far removed from the concerns of the communities they purported 
to represent, would be motivated more by self-interest than by civic virtue.180 State legislators, by 
contrast, because they would be drawn from smaller geographic regions, would be more familiar to 
176 See id. at 1202 (“[T]he world view underlying the Bill of Rights was not dominated by the idea of 
individualistic, countermajoritarian rights.”); Amar, supra note 168, at xii (“The genius of the Bill was . . . not to 
impede popular majorities but to empower them.”); see also Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
1776-1787, at 520 (“[Anti-federalists were localists,’ fearful of distant governmental, even representational, 
authority for very significant political and social reasons that in the final analysis must be called democratic.”).
177 See Amar, supra note 168, at xiii.
178 Id. at 11; see also Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, and Party, 84 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 12, 30 (1989 (“The Anti-Federalists . . . believed [that] a large republic with a fragmented and dispersed 
citizenry gave decisive advantages to organized elites – specifically, government officials, the wealthy, and men of 
commerce.”); Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 276 (“[T]he 
best practical representation, even in a small state, must be several degrees more aristocratical than the body of the 
people.”); Speech by Melancton Smith (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing, supra note 173, at 157 (“[T]his 
Government is so constituted, that the representatives will generally be composed of . . . the natural aristocracy of 
the country.”).
179 Amar, supra note 168, at 11; see also McWilliams, supra note 178, at 25 (“The Anti-Federalists . . . argued 
that . . . in large states, rulers could know their people only as so many abstractions.”); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient 
Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 90 (1989) (noting the Anti-Federalists’ fear that their “so-called representatives, ignorant of their 
constituents’ needs, and both literally and psychically distant from their constituents, would pass laws that were 
unsuited to the different parts of the republic”); Speech by Melancton Smith (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing, 
supra note 173, at 157 (“[R]epresentatives [should] resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of 
the people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be 
disposed to seek their true interests.”); 3 Elliot, supra note 85, at 322 (statement of Patrick Henry) (“[I]nstead of a 
confidential connection between the electors and the elected, they will be absolutely unacquainted with each 
other.”).
180 See Amar, supra note 168, at xiii.
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their constituents and more familiar with local conditions, and therefore more trustworthy.181  The 
Bill of Rights was proposed and adopted as a method of cutting back on the potential self-dealing on 
the part of the people’s national representatives by facilitating “the ability of local governments to 
monitor and deter federal abuse.”182
The notion that a responsive and representative local authority could provide a check on 
the abuses of an unrepresentative central authority was deeply ingrained in the minds of the framers.  
At the time of the framing, many of the State governments were well into their second century.183  In 
the dozen years or so from 1763 until the Revolution began, “colonial governments took the lead in 
protecting their citizens from perceived Parliamentary abuses.  Colonial legislatures kept a close eye 
on the central government; sounded public alarms whenever they saw oppression in the works; and 
organized political, economic, and (ultimately) military opposition to perceived British evils.”184
The idea here is not that the Bill of Rights was designed to protect collective rights rather 
than individual rights.  To the contrary, the Anti-Federalists saw the two as fairly
indistinguishable.185 The prevailing Anti-Federalist thought at the time viewed individuals as 
primarily constituent parts of the community.186  Accordingly, the fortunes of the individual were 
181 See id. at 11; accord Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in 1 Storing, supra 
note 173, at 17.
182 Amar, supra note 168, at xiii. 
183 See id. at 5 (pointing out that the Virginia “House of Burgesses had been meeting since the 1620s”).
184 Id.  See also id. at 4 (“[The] states’ rights tradition . . . extoll[ed] the ability of local governments to protect 
citizens against abuses by central authorities.”).
185 See id. at 128 (‘[The] point is not that substantive rights are unimportant, but that these rights were 
intimately intertwined with structural considerations.”).
186 See McWilliams, supra note 178, at19 (noting the Anti -Federalist view that “[i]ndividuality is possible only 
because political society protects and nurtures our individual strengths and attributes, making it possible for each of 
us to do what he or she does best”); id. at 19-20 (“It was common for Anti-Federalists to argue . . . that political 
societies, once created, became one body,’ a collective second nature that subsumes and supersedes all or most 
individual rights.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Speech by Melancton Smith (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing, 
supra note 173, at 149, 153).
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intimately intertwined with the fortunes of his fellow citizens as a collective whole.187 The ultimate 
goal was preservation of individual liberty and self-determination by protecting the collective rights 
of “the people,” a phrase that is repeated five times in the Bill.188 Thus, individual rights and 
collective rights are often “marbled together” in the provisions of the Bill.189
Unfortunately, this original view of the Bill of Rights has been lost to the courts and all but 
a few scholars.  Since most of the modern Supreme Court cases interpreting the Bill of Rights have 
come from the States, they have really been interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Given 
the focus of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment on the protection of former 
slaves and other minorities – ethnic, religious, and political – from dominant local majorities, that
Amendment has a distinctively individual-rights hue.190  This, in turn, has colored the way we think 
187 See Amar, supra note 168, at 126 (quoting leading Anti-Federalists who expressly conjoined concerns for 
both individual and states’ rights); see also id. at xii (“A close look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly 
interconnected with language of rights . . . .”); Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the 
Establishment Clause:  Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 95, 113 (1996) 
(“[B]ecause the anti-federalists felt that individuals are defined primarily by their communities, they stressed the 
interconnections and interdependencies between individuals and society.”); McWilliams, supra note 178, at 24 
(observing that Anti-Federalists “link[ed] [individual] well-being with that of the community”); Herbert J. Storing, 
What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in 1 Storing, supra note 173, at 15 (“The Anti-Federalists’ defense of 
federalism and of the primacy of the states rested on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the 
states and the preservation of individual liberty, which is the end of any legitimate government.”).
188 See U.S. Const., amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble . . . .”); id. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); id. 
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, houses, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); id. amend IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of  certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); id. amend X (“The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”).
189 Amar, supra note 168, at 222.  It must be conceded that even some Anti-Federalists admitted to a more 
modern understanding of the Bill of Rights as a means of “secur[ing] the minority against the usurpation and 
tyranny of the majority.”  Letter of Agrippa to the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in 4 Storing, 
supra note 173, at 111.  See also Essay by a Farmer (Feb. 15, 1788), reprinted in 5 Storing, supra note 173, at 15 
(“[T]he rights of individuals are frequently opposed to the apparent interests of the majority – For this reason the 
greater the portion of political freedom in a form of government the greater the necessity of a bill of rights . . . .”).  
However, these sentiments were rarely expressed by the Anti-Federalists.
190 See Amar, supra note 168, at 7 (“Through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the Bill has been pressed into the 
service of protecting vulnerable minorities from dominant social majorities.  Given the core concerns of the 
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about the provisions of the Bill of Rights itself, since, through the fiction of incorporation, we 
pretend we are interpreting the first eight Amendments rather than the Fourteenth.191  Thus, we think 
of the Bill of Rights as emphasizing individual rights, even though the Bill itself was – and is – far
more concerned with federalism, popular sovereignty, and collective rights than we typically 
acknowledge.192
Some have gone so far as to suggest a “two-track” model for at least some of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, proposing different constraints when those provisions are applied to 
the States than when they are applied to the federal government.193 After all, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment arguably incorporates the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the States, it “did not 
Fourteenth Amendment, all this is fitting . . . . ”); id. at 23 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment “focuses more on 
overweening majoritarianism than attenuated representation”).
191 See id. at 7 (“Like people with spectacles who often forget that they are wearing them, most lawyers read 
the Bill of Rights through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing how powerfully that lens has 
refracted what they see.”); see also Amar, supra note 175, at 1201 (‘[A]doption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears to have transformed the nature of the Bill.”).
192 See McWilliams, supra note 178, at 20 (“In advocating a Bill of Rights, the Anti-Federalists most zealously 
defended public freedoms and the right to a republican civil life.”); see also Amar, supra note 168, at 23 (“[P]opular 
speech was the paradigm of our First Amendment . . . .”); id. at 26 (“The right of the people to assemble does not 
simply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet together; it is also an express reservation of 
the collective right of We the People to assemble . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 30 (“As with assembly, the core 
petition right is collective and popular . . . .”); id. at 55-56 (“[T]he militia system [protected by the Second 
Amendment] was carefully designed to protect liberty through localism.  [F]reedom and federalism pulled 
together.”); id. at 67-68 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment evinces at least as much concern with the agency problem of 
protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy as with protecting minorities against 
majorities of fellow citizens.”); id. at 82 (“[M]ost [of the] provisions of Amendments V-VIII were centrally 
concerned with the agency problem – the danger that government officials might attempt to rule in their own self-
interest at the expense of their constituents’ sentiments and liberty.”).
193 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n the context 
of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar 
action by the Federal Government.”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“It 
may . . .  be that the States, while bound to observe strict neutrality [with regard to religion], should be freer to 
experiment with involvement – on a neutral basis – than the Federal Government.”); Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 
142-43 (suggesting that a “two-track” model apply to the Establishment Clause).  At least three Justices have 
suggested such a “two-track” model for the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  See Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 501, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250, 288, 294-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).  See also Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 140-42 (discussing merits of this view).
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repeal the fundamentally populist philosophy of the original Constitution and Bill of Rights.”194
Thus, Amar advocates what he calls “refined incorporation,” by which only those provisions of the 
Bill of Rights that guarantee an individual right, “rather than a right of states or the public at large,” 
are incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.195 Moreover, even those provisions that are 
incorporated might apply in different ways to the States than when applied to the federal 
government.196 Recent research reveals that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights
are particularly susceptible of such a “two-track” interpretation.
B. The Original Purpose of the Criminal Procedure Protections of the Bill of Rights
While Amar declines to apply a “two-track” model to the criminal procedure protections 
of the Bill of Rights,197 George Thomas picks up where Amar leaves off.  In a recent work, Thomas 
shows that these provisions were “not designed with accuracy of outcome as the primary goal.”198
Rather, “the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the successful 
federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or innocent.”199  Indeed, “the Framers 
194 Amar, supra note 168, at 103.
195 Id. at xiv.
196 See id.
197 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles (1997) (positing 
unitary theory of criminal procedure protections); see also Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and 
Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559, 1562 n.19 (1996) (book 
review) (noting that “Amar’s refined incorporation’ is not invoked” in Amar’s work on criminal procedure); id. at 
1563 (“[Amar] believes in a single, national set of individual rights against criminal investigation and prosecution . . 
. .”).
198 Thomas, supra note 53, at 152; see also id. at 174 (“We have come to believe . . . that the reason to have 
protections benefiting criminals is that these protections best deliver accurate verdicts . . . .”).
199 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 156 (“[T]he Bill of Rights . . . sought to impose restrictions on 
the federal government without regard to the innocence of particular defendants.”); id. at 160 (“The principal 
concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect innocent defendants.  The Framers instead intended to create 
formidable obstacles to federal investigation and prosecution of crime”); id. at 174-75 (“The Framers did not focus 
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almost surely intended the Bill of Rights to permit guilty defendants to go free.”200  On this reading, 
the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights, like the rest of the Bill, are “profoundly 
antigovernment.”201  It is only because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
primarily concerned with protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction and punishment, and 
because most of our current jurisprudence stems from that Amendment, that we believe the criminal 
procedure protections of the Bill of Rights themselves to be concerned with the accuracy of trials.202
Again, we are entranced by the optical illusion of incorporation.
This view largely explains why the Anti-Federalists cared so much about preserving and 
fortifying the right to trial by jury in criminal cases.203  Although Article III of the Constitution 
already guaranteed trial by jury to “be held in the State where the . . . Crimes shall have been 
committed,”204 the Anti-Federalists spent much energy advocating for an even stricter rule.  This 
rule, which ultimately found its way into the Sixth Amendment, goes even further, in two respects:  
first, it guarantees also that the trial take place, not just in the “State” where the crime was 
committed, but also within the “district”; and second, it guarantees also that the jury come from that 
on  separating the guilty from the innocent because they were concerned with curtailing the power of federal 
prosecutors and judges.”).
200 Id. at 156.
201 Id at 175; see also id. at 232 (“[T]he Bill of Rights . . . was fundamentally antigovernment.  It was not 
designed to produce fair outcomes or reasonable accommodations to permit more effective crime control.  It was 
designed to hobble the federal prosecution of crime.”).
202 See Dripps, supra note 197, at 1637 (“[P]reventing punishment outside the criminal process, and ensuring 
that the criminal process does all it can to prevent unjust convictions, are the core ideas of due process of law.”); id. 
(“Arbitrary searches and seizures deprive people of liberty without due process, for it is the prospect of a valid 
prosecution that justifies coercive methods of investigation.”).
203 See Amar, supra note 168, at 83 (“The dominant strategy to keep agents of the central government under 
control was to use the populist and local institution of the jury.”); Thomas, supra note 53, at 176 (“[I]t was 
correcting the Article III jury right that was the passion of the anti-Federalists.”).
204 U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, para. 3.
44
same State and district.205 The Anti-Federalists believed that the jury, in its role as the voice of the 
local community,206 could be counted on to sympathize with a defendant who was being persecuted 
by the federal government, even if he were guilty.207  The jury was “interpose[d] between the 
citizens and the central government as a way to place stringent limitations on the federal 
government.”208 This tactic was familiar to the Framers.  Prior to the Revolution, when locals 
disloyal to the Crown were tried for violating such valid but unpopular laws as those prohibiting 
smuggling, the defendants often could count on local juries to acquit against the evidence.209 The 
Anti-Federalists’ focus on these particulars of the jury-trial right strengthens the inference that the 
Bill of Rights was not primarily intended to protect just the innocent, for their preoccupation would 
be “an odd historical fact if protecting innocence were uppermost in the minds of the Framers.”210
The Anti-Federalists were insistent on throwing the  procedural hurdles of the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments in the paths of federal investigators, prosecutors, and judges, 
because, just as “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,”211 the power to prosecute is the 
power to persecute.  “The Framers feared that the powerful federal government would seek to 
205
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”  U.S. Const., amend VI.
206 See Thomas, supra note 53, at 177 (“The colonists wanted not truth so much as the voice and the law of the 
community.”); see also Amar, supra note 168, at 88-89 (“[T]he jury would be composed of citizens from the same 
community, and its actions were expected to be informed by community values.”).
207 See Amar, supra note 168, at 84 (“[T]he jury played a leading role in protecting ordinary individuals 
against governmental overreaching.”).
208 Thomas, supra note 53, at 177; see also Amar, supra note 168, at 87 (“[T]he criminal petit jury could 
interpose itself on behalf of the people’s rights by refusing to convict when the executive sought to trump up charges 
against its political critics . . . .”); Thomas, supra note 53, at 179 (“[A] jury who knows the defendant’s character 
will nullify a prosecution that was viewed as overreaching on the part of the federal government, without regard to 
whether the defendant was factually guilty.”).
209 See Thomas, supra note 53, at 176-77.
210 Id. at 156.
211 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
45
persecute its enemies through the use of federal law.”212 Again, the Framers had seen this before.  
After all, “many of the Framers themselves had violated British [criminal] law.”213  “[F]resh from 
[their] experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists, and traitors to the regime of George III,”214
the Framers identified and empathized with those enmeshed in the criminal justice system and guilty 
of laws that were, to them, unjust.215 Moreover, just as King George had concentrated his efforts on 
the colonists, the same power to persecute via unpopular criminal laws might be used by the federal 
government to target particular sections of the nation.216 Before the Bill of Rights was ratified, this 
is what the Anti-Federalists saw:
[A] powerful federal government that wanted to eradicate its enemies.  The 
legislature might enact general search warrants that could be used to sweep 
buildings, neighborhoods, and whole towns, looking not for evidence of crimes 
of violence or theft but, instead, for evidence of opposition to the government.  
[A] grand jury could subpoena those suspected of harboring antigovernment 
sentiments and force them to answer questions about their activities and their 
friends under threat of contempt.  [P]rosecutors could bring a criminal 
prosecution in a corner of the State far from where the alleged crime occurred; 
the defendant would be unknown and without friends and resources to assist in 
his defense.  If the judge set bail impossibly high, the defendant could be held in 
jail for months or years waiting for the prosecution to proceed.  When trial did 
finally begin, under the supervision of a lax federal judge, it could be done 
largely by affidavit . . . without a lawyer for the defendant and without access to 
subpoena power to compel attendance of defense witnesses.  And if the 
defendant somehow escaped with an acquittal, or with a sentence that the 
prosecutor found too lenient, the prosecutor could prosecute the same offense 
all over again.217
212 Thomas, supra note 53, at 152; see also O’Hear, supra note 22, at 
213 Thomas, supra note 53, at 156.
214 Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1954).
215 See Thomas, supra note 53, at 175 (arguing that early federal laws prohibited “what seemed to [some] little 
more than antigovernment conduct”).
216 See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 759 (“[F]ederal law enforcement has the ability to concentrate its resources 
on particular types of offenses in particular geographic areas.”).
217 Thomas, supra note 53, at 158-59; see also Amar, supra note 175, at 1183 (“[C]riminal law inspired dread 
and jealousy.”).
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Thus, the Fifth Amendment, save for its final clause, and the entirety of the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments, specifically address the procedures to be followed in criminal cases.  And although the 
Fourth Amendment does not, strictly speaking, apply only in the criminal arena, its limits on the 
powers of investigation in the pre-regulatory state surely had its predominant impact on the criminal 
process.218
Why does the prospect of a government’s abuse of the criminal law engender such fear, 
for us as much as for the Anti-Federalists?  Certainly, a tyrannical central government might use the 
civil courts to persecute and torment its adversaries as well.  It might bankrupt its enemies by 
exacting stiff forfeitures and civil fines for violations of federal law.219 To be sure, the Anti-
Federalists fought for the right to trial by jury in federal civil matters as well as in criminal cases.  
Yet the provisions of the Bill of Rights pertaining exclusively to civil trials – the Civil Jury 
Clause,220 the Reexamination Clause,221 and the civil application of the Due Process Clause222 – are 
duplicative of, and not nearly as extensive as, those occasioning criminal trials.  To be sure, the 
primary check on the central government in criminal cases as well as civil was “the populist and 
218 See Thomas, supra note 53, at 158 (“The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments mostly have to do 
with the power of the federal government to identify and punish criminals . . . .).
219 See id. at 179 (noting that Bill of Rights “make[s] it difficult for the federal government . . . to subject 
anyone to forfeiture, fines, and civil penalties”).
220 See U.S. Const., amend VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy, shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
221 See U.S. Const., amend VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).  In criminal trials, the function of this Clause is 
largely performed by the Double Jeopardy Clause, id. amend V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).  See Amar, supra note 168, at 96 (comparing Double 
Jeopardy and Reexamination Clauses).
222 See U.S. Const., amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”).
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local institution of the jury.”223 One may ask why, in addition to the jury-trial rights, the Anti-
Federalists insisted on all of the other accoutrements of the criminal process contained in the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.224 The answer lies in the recognition of the Anti-Federalists’ 
deep respect for the value of community participation, and their deep fear of the central 
government’s potential ability to re- shape local communities through the criminal law.
C. The Criminal Conviction and Its Impact on Community Participation
The value of community participation was a central tenet in Anti-Federalist thought.225
Indeed, the Anti-Federalists valued local autonomy over centralized governance precisely because 
de-centralized decisionmaking “would enable the people to participate more directly, through debate 
and dialogue, in the decisions that would affect their lives.”226  As Hanna Pitkin has summarized this 
view, “the distinctive promise of political freedom remains the possibility of genuine collective 
action, an entire community consciously and jointly shaping its policy, its way of life.”227 Such 
collective action through widespread participation yields benefits for the polity itself.  First, those 
who actively participate in the political life of the community “have more of a stake in the outcome 
223 Amar, supra note 168, at 83; see supra text accompanying notes 203 to 210.
224 It is on this point that, in my opinion, Amar’s account falls short.  While justifiably focusing on the right to 
jury trials, in both civil and criminal cases, as the Anti-Federalists’ “dominant strategy to keep agents of the central 
government under control,” Amar, supra note 168, at 83, this was not their only strategy.   Amar originally 
characterized the remaining protections of the Sixth Amendment as “nonstructural benefits,” i.e., as purely 
individual rights.  See Amar, supra note 175, at 1197.  When he later expressed his views in book form, however, 
Amar removed the word “nonstructural,” see Amar, supra note 168, at 106, perhaps indicating a willingness to 
consider the remaining criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights as also having some structural 
components.
225 See Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 111 (“[T]he concern for widespread participation in community 
decisionmaking was a  crucial strain in anti-federalist thought.”).
226 Id.
227 Hanna F. Pitkin, Justice:  On Relating Private and Public, 9 Pol. Theory 327, 344 (1981).
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for their community and will concern themselves with public, as opposed to private, issues.”228  In 
addition, widespread participation in community affairs fosters a sense of legitimacy and confidence 
regarding the outcomes of the political process. This sense of legitimacy obviates the desire for 
those who find themselves on the losing side of an issue to resort to extra-legal means to attain their 
goals.229 Thus, active participation in the political life of the community by its constituent members 
is essential for the prosperity and well-being of the community itself.230
The Anti-Federalists’ focus on active community participation explains their deep 
concern with the specter of the new federal government’s using the criminal law as a tool of 
oppression. The criminal process is unique in its ability to strip people of citizenship, of their right 
to participate fully in the political life of the community.  A citizen who has lost a civil case is bit 
lighter in the wallet, perhaps, but still a citizen.  His vote in local and national elections still counts
as much as anyone else’s; he is still eligible to serve on juries and in militias; and his voice still 
carries the same authority it had had before.
By stark contrast, a criminal conviction has always been treated differently. By dint of a 
criminal conviction, the lawbreaker is both actually and constructively excluded from the political 
community.  Most obviously, the coercive sanction itself works a permanent or temporary physical 
exclusion of the outlaw from the community:  execution permanently and completely excludes the 
lawbreaker, while imprisonment and banishment work a complete exclusion of the outlaw from the 
228 Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 114; accord Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1510 (1989) (book review) (arguing that those who participate in 
governance have vested stake in community and that if they are too far removed from governance, their interests 
turn to private matters); Pitkin, supra note 227, at 347 (asserting that those involved in community affairs ultimately 
concern themselves with “the long-range and large-scale significance of what we want and are doing”).
229 See Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 114 (“[P]articipation in governance fosters confidence in the laws that 
government produces, leading to a more stable polity.”) (footnote omitted); see also Herbert Storing, What the Anti-
Federalists Were For, reprinted in 1 Storing, supra note 173, at 16-17 (arguing that political participation is essential 
for respect for law).
230 See Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 113.
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community either permanently or temporarily.231 In addition, those convicted of felonies are 
typically disenfranchised: they may not hold office, sit on juries, or vote.232  In some States today, 
this disenfranchisement is permanent.233  In nearly all, it lasts at least as long as the felon is serving 
his sentence.234  And, critically, most state disenfranchisement laws do not distinguish between state 
and federal offenders.235  That is, those convicted of federal felonies are disenfranchised from 
participating in matters of State governance.  Thus it is that the federal government, through use or 
abuse of the power of the criminal process, could greatly affect the composition of the polity at the 
State level.
But there is more.  Even beyond the literal exclusion from the political community that 
comes with such punishments as execution, imprisonment, banishment, and disenfranchisement , 
those convicted of a crime carry another serious disability into the political arena.  What truly 
distinguishes criminal from civil liability is that, in Henry Hart’s oft-quoted words, a criminal 
conviction entails the “formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the 
community.”236 There is a distinctive expressive component to criminal punishment.237 The 
criminal conviction stigmatizes in a way that the civil judgment does not.238
231 Indeed, the etymological derivation of the word “outlaw” stems from the lawbreaker’s status as someone 
“outside the law” and therefore deprived of the benefits and protections of the community.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 761 (6th ed. abr. 1991).
232 See Developments in the Law, One Person, No Vote:  The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1939, 1942-43 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote].  This was equally true at the time of the founding.  
See Letter from the Federal Farmer (Dec. 31, 1787), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 267 (observing that 
those “convicted of crimes . . . are excluded any share in the government.”).
233 See One Person, No Vote, supra note 232, at 1143 (noting that eight States take this position).
234 See id. at 1142 (“Only two states . . . grant prisoners the franchise.”).
235 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons:  A State-By-State Survey ii (updated Oct., 
1996) (online at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/forms/state_survey.pdf) (“The disabilities imposed upon felons under 
state law generally are assumed to apply with the same force whether the conviction is a state or federal one; in only 
a few states have particular disabilities been held not to apply to federal offenders.”).
236 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 405 (1958).
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This stigma can understandably be expected to detract from one’s voice in the political 
process.239 After all, political participation potentially consists of more than running for office or 
casting a vote.  Participation includes all “arenas of citizenship in the comparably broad sense in 
which citizenship encompasses not just formal participation in affairs of state but also respected and 
self-respecting presence – distinct and audible voice – in public and social life at large.”240 As Carol 
Rose cogently observed:
[V]oting may well be a relatively minor aspect of local civic participation.  
Other versions of voice may be much more important locally:  the informal 
constituent contacts, the PTA meetings, the civic groups’ banging on the door at 
city hall, the cub reporters’ scandal-mongering, the highly issue-oriented 
jawboning that is the very stuff of local controversy.241
Because all public life involves interactions among citizens, interactions that can potentially shape 
the social and political views of the participants, all public life is potentially political.242 Thus can a 
citizen’s voice be dampened or even muted by the stigma that attaches upon a criminal conviction.
Federal criminal law, then, posed the greatest danger of all to the Anti-Federalists, for 
nothing gives a sovereign greater power to reshape communities than the power of the criminal law.  
237 See Lee, supra note 84, at 712 (“[T]he institution of punishment has an expressive dimension.  When it 
punishes, it condemns the behavior it punishes as wrong . . . .”).
238 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“A prosecution for 
addiction, with its resulting stigma and irreparable damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a 
means of protecting society, where a civil commitment would do as well.”). That the framers recognized this is 
evidenced by the constraint placed on the federal government in the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 
its ability to prosecute for “infamous crime[s]”: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”  U.S. Const., amend. V.  See Schwartz 
& Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 794.
239 Cf. Lee, supra note 84, at 718 (noting that “the stigma attached to criminals” is one factor detracting from 
“effective lobbying of behalf of criminal defendants”).
240 Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988).
241 Rose, supra note 179, at 97.
242 Se Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 114; Pitkin, supra note 227, at 346.
51
The Anti-Federalists were not so naïve as to believe that citizens were so uniformly virtuous as to 
render the criminal law unnecessary.  To the contrary, “they recognized the need for coercion and 
constraint” of those disinclined to follow society’s basic norms.243  Yet, they sought to reserve 
largely to the States the power to shape the community through the use of the criminal sanction.  Just 
as the Anti-Federalists sought to retain control over the intermediate associations of jury, militia, and 
church,244 so, too, they strived to retain control over the criminal process.
D. The Anti-Federalists and the Eighth Amendment
It remains to be seen why the Anti-Federalists fought to enshrine the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause in the Constitution. What really frightened them was the prospect of a distant 
central government using its power to alter the character of local communities by deciding, remotely, 
who could and could not be part of those communities.  Given this, it would seem that the criminal 
procedure protections contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments were sufficient to the 
task.  Once the hurdles established by these provisions were cleared and a defendant was convicted 
despite them, it would seem that the jig was up.  The stigma traditionally attached to the convict 
would be indelibly applied, his ability to participate in the life of the community forever altered, and 
the character of the community changed.
It is true that criminal conviction in and of itself works to exclude the convict from the 
community.  But the punishment attached to the conviction is also critical, for it dictates the nature, 
the extent, and the length of that exclusion.  Non-confinement punishments work no additional 
exclusion from the community but for the substantial effects of the stigma attaching to the 
243 McWilliams, supra note 178, at 22.
244 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 168, at 45 (“The possibility of national control over [the church,] a powerful 
intermediate association self-consciously trying to influence citizens’ worldviews, shape their behavior, and 
cultivate their habits obviously struck fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists.”).
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conviction itself.  Such exclusion is merely constructive.  Imprisonment, on the other hand, works an 
actual exclusion from the community, temporarily or for life.  And execution, of course, permanently 
and absolutely removes the lawbreaker from his community.
Moreover, the nature, extent, and length of punishment also determine the level of stigma 
the community places on a particular offender.245 Some non-confinement punishments, such as the 
pillory or ducking stool, were designed almost exclusively to shame the lawbreaker, while others, 
such as the imposition of a fine, involve little more stigma than that imposed by the criminal 
conviction itself.  Still others, such as whipping and branding, appear designed to inflict both pain 
and shame on the offender.
Even when comparing two sentences involving the same type of punishment, the amount 
or degree of punishment imposed sends a strong message about the community’s view of the 
respective crimes.  Intuitively, for example, we know that the person who has just served a one-day
sentence in county jail is likely not quite as deserving of our scorn as the person who has just served 
twenty-five years in the state penitentiary, even without knowing that the latter offender was 
convicted of rape or murder while the former offender’s transgression was spitting on the sidewalk.
“[W]hen the state punishes, how one’s punishment stands in relation to punishments for other crimes 
supplies a crucial piece of information as to how wrong the behavior punished is viewed by the 
society.”246
The Anti-Federalists wanted largely to reserve to the States the power, not only to 
investigate, prosecute, and convict people for crimes, but to determine what kind of punishment, and 
how much, each type of transgression would merit.  They did not wish to leave to the new federal 
245 See Lee, supra note 84, at 712 (“[T]he degree to which . . . behavior is condemned is expressed by varying 
the amount of punishment.”).
246 Id.
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government the power to do so, for such authority was part and parcel of the power to re-shape 
communities that the Anti-Federalists so feared would fall into the hands of the central government:
[T]he effects of sentencing tend to be localized:  the sense of vindication felt by 
victims and the community; the deterrence of future crimes in the community; the 
defendant’s loss of liberty; and the disruption of relationships between the 
defendant and his or her family and friends.  [W]hen federal courts impose 
nationally determined sentences . . . they inappropriately undermine the integrity 
of localized responses.247
Concern over the dramatic “effect[s] of harsh sentences on families, communities, and the offender’s 
capacity for rehabilitation,”248 explains why, today as in 1791, States might wish to impose more 
lenient punishment on lawbreakers than does the federal government:
When federal incarceration results in the disintegration of a family, state and 
local agencies must pick up the pieces.  When federal incarceration results in 
the removal of young males from a community en masse, the costs are felt 
primarily at a state and local level.  When federal inmates are returned years 
later with poor job prospects and high risks of recidivism, the localized 
community suffers again.249
Likewise, “the removal of large numbers of working-age males to prison may cause substantial 
social and economic instability, including churning’ in local labor markets that may make the 
communities unattractive to businesses.”250
As in many other ways, in reserving to the States the power to define for themselves the 
outer limits of the criminal sanction, the Anti-Federalists intertwined notions of individual rights and 
state autonomy.  Thus, leading Anti-Federalist George Mason expressly invoked both State power 
247 O’Hear, supra note 22, at 755.
248 Id. at 760.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 760 n.237.
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and individual rights as potential casualties  of Congress’ feared power, pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause,251 to devise criminal punishments:
Under their own Construction of the general Clause at the End of the 
enumerated powers the Congress may grant Monopolies in Trade and 
Commerce, constitute new Crimes, inflict unusual and severe Punishments, and 
extend their Power as far as they shall think proper; so that the State 
Legislatures have no Security for the Powers now presumed to remain to them; 
or the People for their Rights.252
This statement is a striking example of the Anti-Federalist concept of the intimate interconnections 
between individual and collective rights.  The “Powers” of “the State Legislatures” and the “Rights” 
of “the People” are thought to be aligned one with the other against the central government.
Moreover, the concern over Congress’ supposed power to “grant Monopolies” – surely, a concern 
sounding more in structure than in individual rights – is lumped together with its purported power to 
“inflict unusual and severe Punishments.”  Though the latter sounds to modern ears as a purely 
individual-rights matter, it is not so easily disentangled from structural concerns.
Finally, the Anti-Federalists’ goal, through the Eighth Amendment, of limiting the federal 
power to punish fits nicely with a dominant theme in Anti-Federalist thought:  minimization of the 
use of force by government against citizen.  The Anti-Federalists adhered to the notion that, in an 
ideal polity, persuasion would be the rule and force the exception.  As one prominent Anti-Federalist
wrote:  “Our true object is . . . to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary 
as possible.”253  A government that relied primarily on force of arms to keep order could not truly 
call itself republican.  Thus, coercion and force would be essential in some instances, but Anti-
251 See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”).
252 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention (1787), reprinted 
in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 11.
253 Letter from the Federal Farmer (Dec. 31, 1787), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 264.
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Federalist doctrine called for use of force only in such amounts as would be necessary.  The Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause can be explained as a measure designed to keep criminal 
punishments from going beyond what was necessary to deter and punish criminals.
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
The problem with all prevailing theories of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is that each addresses a potential type of overreaching by government against 
citizen in general terms.  None takes into account the unique concerns that drove the Anti-Federalists 
to limit the new federal government’s prospective venture into the world of criminal justice.  The 
goal of a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is to find a theory that achieves 
maximum coherence with both the Amendment’s Anti-Federalist underpinnings and the well 
developed, and generally well informed, jurisprudence that has grown up around the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In order to formulate a distinctive jurisprudence for the “pure” Eighth 
Amendment, then, it is necessary to re-examine current doctrine and determine how it should be 
translated into language the Anti-Federalists would understand.
By taking the principles that have emerged from traditional theories of the Eighth 
Amendment, and by distilling these principles through the Anti-Federalist filter of federalism, 
popular sovereignty, and collective rights, we can devise at least one principle of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence that applies only in “pure” Eighth Amendment cases.  That principle is easy to apply, 
commonsensical, and follows almost inexorably from the Anti-Federalist underpinnings of the Bill 
of Rights:  the federal government may not impose a mode of punishment, including death, within 
the bounds of any State in which that mode of punishment is unauthorized by law.  Happily, this 
principle also coheres with much of contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence while avoiding 
some of its pitfalls.
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A. Re(dis)covering the Eighth Amendment:  Abiding the Will of “The People” in 
Abjuring “Cruel and Unusual” Modes of Punishment
Again, the basic theme running through the Bill of Rights is the protection of individual 
rights through the retention of popular sovereignty and local control.254  Against this backdrop, 
consider again the statements of Abraham Holmes and Patrick Henry.  The paradigmatic “unusual” 
punishments they discussed were those practiced during the Spanish Inquisition and by the major 
Continental governments (“France, Spain, and Germany”) more generally.255 The overarching 
concern was to prevent the new federal government from devising modes of punishment practiced 
on the Continent but unknown to English-speaking peoples, and the newly minted Americans in 
particular.  Holmes’ and Henry’s statements bespeak a design to allow Congress to use only those 
modes of punishment known to English law and, by extension, the laws of the States.  That is, State 
norms constituted the benchmark for whether a federal punishment was “cruel and unusual.”
An Anti-Federalist view of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on certain modes of 
punishment might thus embrace one of several different, increasingly broad propositions.  Most 
narrowly, one might argue that Congress is prohibited only from implementing modes of punishment 
not practiced in the States in 1791.  More broadly, one might argue that Congress is additionally 
prohibited from implementing modes of punishment practiced generally in the States in 1791 but 
which have been later rejected by a national consensus of the States.  Finally, one might argue that 
Congress is also prohibited from implementing within a particular State modes of punishment not 
practiced within that State.  It is this last and broadest proposition that is most coherent with both 
Anti-Federalist thought and current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
254 See supra Part III.A.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 85, 87.
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1. Option #1:  A Prohibition on Imposing Modes of Punishments Not Imposed 
in 1791
An Eighth Amendment doctrine that prohibits Congress from imposing only those 
punishments not generally imposed in 1791 in the States would be consistent, at least superficially,
with an originalist view of the Eighth Amendment.  It would not, however, be consistent with 
current Eighth Amendment doctrine.  At least since Weems v. United States,256 the Court has 
embraced a dynamic rather than a static view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  The 
Court has reiterated many times the plurality’s conclusion in Trop v. Dulles that “[t]he Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”257  While Justices Scalia and Thomas have advocated the view that the Clause’s meaning 
was frozen in time in 1791,258 a majority of the Court has never accepted this view.  “It is now 
beyond serious dispute that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments’ 
is not a static command.”259 Moreover, even Justices Scalia and Thomas have grudgingly accepted 
“evolving standards of decency” as the touchstone.260
In addition, the “evolving standards of decency” standard is probably more coherent with 
the true intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment than is the Scalia/Thomas 
brand of modern originalism.261  The framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment foresaw that 
256 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  See supra notes 109 to 115 and accompanying text.
257 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality) .  See supra text accompanying note 117.
258 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1217 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., 
dissenting). (contending that the Court’s “modern . . . jurisprudence” of using “modern standards of decency’ as the 
touchstone is “mistaken”).
259 Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
260 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339-40 (2002) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
Thomas, J., dissenting).
261 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 948 (1985) 
(asserting that “original intent” initially “referred to the intentions’ of the sovereign parties to the constitutional 
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views on criminal punishments would evolve over time, and it is reasonable to think that they 
anticipated that the limitations on Congress would increase accordingly.  Take the example of 
Pennsylvania.  In 1776, that State adopted a new constitution hailed as establishing “the most 
democratic of the early state constitutions.”262  One of its distinctive features was its progressive 
view on punishments, which was heavily influenced by the reformist views on criminal punishment 
of such Enlightenment figures as Montesquieu.263  Section 38 of the new constitution provided:
“The penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this State, as 
soon as may be, and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more 
proportionate to the crimes.”264 True to form, in 1786, Pennsylvania “abolished the death penalty 
for robbery, burglary, sodomy and buggery.”265  Then, in 1794, scarcely three years after the Bill of 
Rights was ratified, Pennsylvania took the extraordinary step of eliminating the death penalty for 
all crimes but first-degree murder.266
A similar movement occurred in Virginia.  In 1778, Thomas Jefferson drafted a bill that 
would have reserved the death penalty for only the most heinous offenses.267  The Virginia 
legislature, following Pennsylvania’s lead, adopted it in 1796.268  Jefferson later pondered the 
compact [the States], as evidenced in the Constitution's language and discerned through structural methods of 
interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the framers or of anyone else”).
262 Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 
766 (1949).
263 See id. at 767.
264 Id. at 766-67, n.66 (quoting Pa. Const. §§ 38, 39 (1776)); see also Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, 
at 821.
265 Keedy, supra note 262, at 767; see also Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 822.
266 See Keedy, supra note 262, at 772-73.
267 See Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 818.
268 See id.
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“ripening’” of public opinion in Virginia that was necessary before law reform took root, “by time, 
by reflection, and by the example of Pennsylvania.’”269
Thus, movements were afoot in Pennsylvania and Virginia– two of the three most 
populous States in1790270 – to reform criminal punishments, straddling the period during which the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights were framed, debated, and ratified.  In and of itself, this is powerful 
evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment knew that the States’ views on 
punishment were sure to change over time.271  What is more, however, is that Jefferson, lead 
proponent of reform in Virginia, while not a full-blown Anti-Federalist (because he favored 
ratification of the Constitution), certainly shared many Anti-Federalist sentiments regarding state 
sovereignty, federalism, and a limited national government.272  He later, of course, became the hero 
of the Democratic-Republicans, the direct ideological descendents of the Anti-Federalists,273 running 
for President on that line in 1796, 1800, and 1804, winning the latter two races.
Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the Constitutionalists, the leading defenders of the 
progressive 1776 constitution, were later to become known by another moniker:  Anti-Federalists.274
Indeed, Judge George Bryan played a pivotal role in the drafting of the constitution.275 Bryan was 
269 Id. at 818-19 (quoting 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 67 (1903)).
270 See Return of the Whole Number of Persons Within the Several Districts of the United States 3 (1793) 
(available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a-02.pdf) (last viewed Aug. 3, 2005).
271 See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 758 (“[M]ost of the major penological reform movements in the nation’s 
history evolved at the state and local level . . . .”).
272 See, e.g., Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:  Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 Yale L.J. 1317, 
1363-64 (1982).
273 See John E. Nowak, Chasing the Cannon:  A Tail’s View of, and Requests to, the Dog, 17 Const. 
Comment. 375, 379 n.7 (2000) (“The Democratic-Republicans espoused a modified version of the Anti-Federalist 
philosophy; they mirrored the Anti-Federalists in their opposition to the Federalists' political philosophy.”).
274 See 3 Storing, supra note 173, at 3.
275 Keedy, supra note 262, at 766, writes that the constitution was drafted primarily by James Cannon, “with 
the advice and help of Judge Bryan.”  One contemporary writer gave the majority of the credit to Bryan, writing that 
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also “the principal leader of the Anti-Federalists in [Pennsylvania],” 276 probable author of the classic 
Anti-Federalist essay, “Address of the Minority of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives,”277
and father of, and close collaborator with, Samuel Bryan, who, under the name Centinel, was “[t]he 
most prolific and one of the best known of the Anti-Federalist essayists.”278  Accordingly, leading 
Anti-Federalists were not only well aware that the penal law was undergoing reform at the time the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was adopted, but some even paved the way for this 
reform.279
Given this, is it possible that the Anti-Federalist framers and ratifiers of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause intended that Congress would be limited only to the extent that the 
common law limited punishments in 1791?  Suppose, for example, that the day after the Bill of 
Rights had been adopted, each of the States decided to do away with whipping as a form of 
punishment.  Assuming agreement that whipping is “cruel” – that is, severe280 – can it really be 
argued that Congress would have still been permitted, notwithstanding the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, to impose whipping for federal crimes though the practice had been rendered 
“unusual” by dint of its elimination in every single State?  To ask the question is to answer it.
Accordingly, a broader conception of a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment is necessary.
the Constitution “was understood to have been principally the work of Mr. George Bryan, in conjunction with a Mr. 
Cannon, a schoolmaster.’”  Id. (quoting Alexander Graydon, Memoirs of a Life 266 (1811)).
276 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 130.  Accord 1 Storing, supra note 173, at 9; 3 Storing, supra note 173, at 5.
277 See 3 Storing, supra note 173, at 11.
278 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 130.
279 This is not to ignore the important roles of Federalists William Bradford, Thomas Mifflin, Benjamin Rush, 
and James Wilson with regard to the 1794 legal reform in Pennsylvania.  See Keedy, supra note 262, at 768-71.  It is 
only to note the role of a key Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist in the drafting of the extraordinarily progressive 1776 
Pennsylvania Constitution, without which the 1794 legislative reform would not have been possible.
280 See supra text accompanying note 57.
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2. Option #2:  A Prohibition on Imposing Modes of Punishments Abandoned by 
a National Consensus Since 1791
Another possible view is that the Eighth Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing, 
not only those punishments not generally imposed in 1791 in the States, but also those that were 
imposed in 1791 but which have since fallen out of favor according to a national consensus of the 
States.  This is a more attractive theory, given that it is more consistent with current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which has adopted the notion of “evolving standards of decency” and 
which looks largely to whether a national consensus has developed against a particular punishment
in order to determine what those standards are.281  Nevertheless, this conception must be rejected as 
insufficiently broad to be reflective of the Anti-Federalist underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment.
The Anti-Federalists did not see any significance in “national consensus.”  Indeed, if they 
had, they would have been ardent supporters of the new Constitution.  Rather, they “desire[d] a 
continuance of each distinct sovereignty.”282 The Anti-Federalists recognized the diversity among 
the States, and favored “the preservation of the individual states.”283 As Brutus wrote:
The United States includes a variety of climates.  The productions of the different 
parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, are 
diverse.  Their habits and manners differ as much as their climates and 
productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident.  The laws and 
customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some 
opposite . . . .284
281 See supra text accompanying notes 121, 146 to 152.
282 Essay by the Impartial Examiner, Virginia Independent Chronicle (May 28, 1788), reprinted in 5 Storing, 
supra note 173, at 191 (emphasis added).
283 Letter from Robert Yates & John Lansing, Jr., to George Clinton, Gov. of New York (Dec. 21, 1787), 
reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 17 (emphasis added).
284 Essay of Brutus to the Citizens of the State of New York (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 
173, at 369-70.
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While this was part of an argument against conjoining those diverse areas, some Anti-Federalists 
celebrated the diversity among the States, though strictly for instrumentalist reasons.  John Francis 
Mercer wrote:  “A diversity of State-interests, prejudices and parties . . . acting without uniformity 
and frequently counteracting each other, leaves the great majority of the Component Members sound 
and cool to repress the agitation of a part.”285
The Anti-Federalists’ recognition, if not celebration, of diversity among the States was
most clearly manifested in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.286  While each State 
might have preferred having its own majority sect established as the national religion, the Anti-
Federalists settled on everyone’s second choice:  no federal involvement in religion at all while each 
State was free to continue its own established church.287  Again, diversity among the States was seen 
by some as instrumental in preserving liberty.  As John Francis Mercer again put it:  “Parties in 
politics, like sects in Religion, can only be divested of their danger by multiplying their number and 
diversifying their objects.”288
The Anti-Federalists must have well understood that different States would have different 
views of criminal punishment as well.  Indeed, the Virginia and Pennsylvania experiences 
demonstrate this. Although penal reform occurred at about the same time in those States,289 others
lagged behind, in a pattern that continues to this day:  “[V]iews regarding sentencing policy follow 
285 Letter from John Francis Mercer to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1804), reprinted in 5 Storing, supra note 
173, at 31 n.35.  See also Letter of Agrippa (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 4 Storing, supra note 173, at 84 (“A 
diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where there is a common, equal and 
moderate authority to preside, produces friendship.”).
286
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”  U.S. Const., amend. I.
287 See Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 104-05.
288 Letter from John Francis Mercer to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1804), reprinted in 5 Storing, supra note 
173, at 36 n.40.  Of course, this mirrors the classic Federalist defense of union contained in The Federalist No. 10 
(James Madison).
289 See supra notes 262 to 279 and accompanying text.
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strong and consistent’ regional patterns, with residents of New England demonstrating the greatest 
tendency to be lenient and residents of central southern states displaying the least leniency. * * *  
These differing viewpoints express themselves in disparate state sentencing laws.”290  Not only must 
the Anti-Federalists have recognized that the States’ views on criminal punishment were evolving, 
they also must have foreseen that this evolution would take place at different speeds in different
States.291
Moreover, an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that allowed a national consensus to 
govern what Congress could do would not lead us to a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment 
doctrine.  Instead, it would merely replicate the existing “incorporated” Eighth Amendment doctrine.  
Under current law, a particular mode of punishment is forbidden to the States when a national 
consensus against the practice has emerged.292 Presumably, the same would be true if Congress 
attempted to impose a punishment that had been rejected by a national consensus.  And there is no 
reason to think that less of a national consensus would be necessary to show that a punishment is 
“unusual” in the latter case than in the former.  Indeed, after Atkins v. Virginia293 and Roper v. 
Simmons, 294 that hardly seems possible.
290 O’Hear, supra note 22, at 755-56.
291 See Morton, supra note 19, at 1464 (“States, as independent sovereigns, evolve’ at different rates, and a 
state that has chosen to recognize the death penalty as inherently cruel should not be forced to languish behind, 
waiting for its sister states to reach the same conclusion.”).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 109 to 118, 146 to 152.
293 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (finding national consensus against execution of mentally retarded where 40% 
of States, and 53% of States with death penalty, permitted it).
294 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1192 (2005) (finding national consensus against execution for crime committed while 
under age of eighteen where 40% of States, and 53% of States with death penalty, permitted it).
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In sum, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause evinces a design to reserve to each 
State individually, and not to the States generally, the authority to determine its own norms with 
respect to the criminal punishments to be imposed within its borders.
3. Option #3:  A Prohibition on Imposing a Mode of Punishments Within a 
State That Does Not Impose That Punishment
What we are left with, then, is a principle coherent with both the Anti-Federalist 
underpinnings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Clause’s more modern 
manifestation.  That principle dictates that, within the boundaries of a particular State, the federal 
government may not inflict a mode of punishment – including the death penalty – that is 
unauthorized in that State.
This principle dovetails nicely with Anti-Federalist doctrine.  Again, the primary objective 
of the Anti-Federalists was the preservation of popular sovereignty through the continued primacy of 
the States in those spheres carved out by the Bill of Rights.295 Through the criminal procedure 
protections, the Anti-Federalists sought to make it harder for the federal government to investigate, 
prosecute, convict, and punish people for crimes, thereby preserving the States’ traditional control 
over the criminal law.  This would allow the States, for the most part, to maintain control of the 
membership of the political community by giving them primary authority to determine, by use of the 
criminal sanction, whom would be excluded from the community, in what way, and for how long.  
Through the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Anti-Federalists sought to preserve State 
prerogatives in setting the outer limits of the severity of the criminal sanction.  When placed in this 
context, the Clause naturally offers up an interpretation that retains for each State the ultimate 
295 See Massey, supra note 171, at 1249 (setting forth view of Ninth Amendment consistent with the desire of 
the Anti-Federalists “to reserve to the people their rights under local law, and to insulate those rights from federal 
invasion”).
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authority to decide whether a mode of punishment such as the death penalty will be carried out 
within the borders of that State.
This principle reflects a paradigm of the notion of the “marbl[ing] together” in the Bill of 
Rights of individual and collective rights.  The collective polity’s right to determine the absolute 
ceiling on the severity of criminal punishments harmonizes perfectly with the individual citizen’s 
right not to be subjected to a level of punishment exceeding that upper limit.  The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause encompasses both these rights.  In this way, federalism acts, as was originally 
intended, as an additional layer of protection for the rights of individuals.296  The Anti-Federalist 
notion of the intimate interconnection between individual and collective rights is vindicated.
In addition, the principle limiting the federal government to those modes of punishment 
practiced in each individual State is remarkably coherent with current Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  First, the principle is concerned only with prohibiting certain modes of punishment, 
which all agree is one of the core meanings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  While 
Justice Scalia has claimed that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere
cruel’ punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew,”297 he has failed to support this ipse dixit 
with any authority.  Even if one agrees that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause addresses 
only modes of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that certain modes of punishment are 
forbidden “always[]and[]everywhere,” rather than just sometimes and in some places.  The key issue 
is whether, in the particular context, the punishment is “unusual.” This is the premise underlying the 
Court’s categorical bar cases.
296 See id. at 1254 (advocating view of Ninth Amendment that “use[s] the states . . . as structural bulwarks of 
human liberty”).
297 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, the principle makes use of inter- and intra-jurisdictional analysis, collapsed into 
a single inquiry:  is the mode of punishment sought by the federal government in a particular 
geographic area authorized by the State that exercises jurisdiction over that same area?  This inquiry 
avoids the two main pitfalls of the Court’s use of inter- and intra-jurisdictional analyses in the 
disproportionality and categorical bar cases.  First, it is purely objective, as the analyses in these 
other contexts can only purport to be.  There is no comparison between levels of seriousness of 
various crimes, either at the threshold (does a comparison of the punishment to the crime raise an 
inference of disproportionality?) or in the intra-jurisdictional analysis (are more serious crimes 
punished as severely, or equally serious crimes punished less severely?) of the disproportionality 
cases.298
Second, the inquiry is easily answerable.  While the inter-jurisdictional analysis of the 
disproportionality and categorical bar cases commences as a purely objective counting up of 
jurisdictions that do and do not impose the punishment at issue, that is only the beginning of the 
inquiry.  The Court must also somehow divine whether the States on the prohibitionist side of the 
ledger amount to a national consensus.299  By stark contrast, in deciding whether the federal 
government can impose a particular type of punishment, a determination of whether the relevant 
State authorizes the same type of punishment is both the beginning and the end of the inquiry.  If the 
State does not impose that type of punishment, neither can the federal government within that State.  
However, if the people of a State have authorized their State agents to impose a mode of punishment 
298 See supra notes 129 to 138 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 160 to 163 and accompanying text.
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when they deem it necessary, the federal government may impose it as well, even if the State does so 
only rarely.300
In short, this principle posits an active role for the courts in protecting Eighth Amendment 
rights, while leaving virtually no judicial discretion, thus reconciling the otherwise irreconcilable 
tension in the Court’s current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Possible Objections to an Anti-Federalist View of the Federal Death Penalty
A number of objections are possible to this reading of the “pure” Eighth Amendment.  
First, one might deem it unfair to subject a person in one State to the death penalty for commission of 
a federal capital offense, while a similarly situated offender in a State without capital punishment 
will not face execution.  Relatedly, one might contend that allowing local values effectively to 
“reverse preempt” federal law turns the Supremacy Clause on its head.  Third, one might argue that 
the Sixth Amendment’s Jury and Vicinage Clauses  are sufficient to inject local values in federal 
capital trials even in States that reject the death penalty.  Finally, one might contend that the 
proposed principle, if taken to its logical limits, would also prohibit the federal government from 
punishing any lawbreaker more severely than the State in which the conduct occurred could punish 
him for the same conduct.  None of these objections seriously detracts from the interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause proposed here.
1. National Dis-Uniformity as the Price of Federalism
One might first point to the obvious fact that the  reading of the Eighth Amendment 
proposed here will lead to different sentences for similarly situated federal offenders, depending on 
300 See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 769 (“The state maximum sentence will be reasonably easy to determine 
based on a review of state law, but actual state sentencing practices will be far more difficult to establish.”); see also 
id. at 737 (“As a general rule, claims of de jure disparity present a stronger case for departure [from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines] than claims of de facto disparity because it is more certain that the defendant would have 
received a different sentence in state court.”).
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the State in which the crime occurred.301 The goal of achieving national uniformity in the 
administration of the death penalty is precisely the reason the current administration has cited for 
seeking death in States that do not authorize capital punishment.302 While that goal is admirable, 
however, it cannot trump what is the best reading of the Eighth Amendment given its Anti- Federalist 
underpinnings.  The Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights, contemplates dis-uniformity on a 
national scale.  This dis-uniformity is the price we pay for our federal system.303 Moreover, while 
the reading of the Eighth Amendment proposed here breeds national dis-uniformity, it furthers local 
uniformity:  similarly situated offenders within the same State would be treated similarly, 
irrespective of whether one is charged with a federal crime and the other is charged with a State 
crime.304  It is difficult to think of a good reason why national uniformity is more important than 
local uniformity.305
301 See, e.g., Little, Future, supra note 4, at 565 (expressing concern “that a murderer in one federal district 
might get the death penalty for a crime that, had it been committed on the other side of the river or road, could not 
result in a federal death sentence”).
302 See supra notes 25 to 36 and accompanying text.
303 See Morton, supra note 19, at 1464 (“Defining cruel and unusual punishment at a local level might lead to 
disparate results from state to state, but this is hardly a new, or necessarily wrong, outcome.”).
304 See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 725 (“[T]he local uniformity principle insists that similarly situated 
defendants within the same locality receive similar sentences, whether prosecuted in state or federal court.”).
305 See id. (“[O]ne of the central objectives of sentencing reform, the minimization of arbitrariness, provides as 
much support for local as for national uniformity.”).  Congress itself has recognized the importance of federal/State 
parity of sentences, albeit on a lesser scale.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4), (7) (directing Federal Sentencing 
Commission to consider “the community view of the gravity of the offense” and “the current incidence of the 
offense in the community” in formulating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
13 (criminalizing “any act or omission” committed on federal land situated within a State which would be criminal 
pursuant to the laws of that State, and subjecting any person in violation “to a like punishment” as he would receive 
pursuant to State law); see also S. Rep. No.98-225, at 170 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 
(“[C]ommunity norms concerning particular criminal behavior might be justification for increasing or decreasing the 
recommended penalties for the offense.”).
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Calvin Massey has compellingly made a similar argument in a related area.  He asserts that 
the Ninth Amendment306 was designed to allow States to carve out in their own constitutions 
additional rights to be free from federal encroachment, over and above those granted in the Bill of 
Rights, which rights are federally enforceable and protected.307 Massey concedes that, on this 
reading, the Ninth Amendment could not “be applied uniformly across the country,” and that “some 
Americans will enjoy more individual liberty than others.”308  However, he defends this result as 
both a descriptive and prescriptive matter:  “Such a result is the probable intention of the [N]inth 
[A]mendment, part of the legacy of a system of dual sovereignty, and in any case, a virtue.  The 
citizens of each state would be entitled to define their relationship with all of their governmental 
agents.”309 Precisely the same can be said of the Ninth Amendment’s next-door neighbor, the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
2. The Supremacy Clause and “Reverse Preemption”
A related objection would focus on the fact that the principle advocated here seems to turn 
the Supremacy Clause310 on its head. It is true that this principle appears to allow a State to, in 
effect, “reverse preempt” federal legislation.  The answer to this must be a resounding:  “So what?”  
On an Anti-Federalist reading of the Bill of Rights, one of its purposes is precisely to carve out 
306
 “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.”  U.S. Const., amend. IX.
307 See Massey, supra note 171, at 1238.  My contentions regarding the Eighth Amendment are not precisely 
coterminous with Massey’s regarding the Ninth.  He contends that only those rights enshrined in a state constitution 
are deserving of recognition in the Ninth Amendment, see id. at 1233, while my argument is that so long as a state 
does not authorize capital punishment, whether by virtue of its constitution, legislation, or mere absence of 
legislation, that punishment is “unusual” in that State within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  In this regard, 
the arguments made by student commentator Sean Morton, see note 52, are similar to Massey’s.
308 Massey, supra note 171, at 1248.
309 Id.  See also id. (“[N]inth [A]mendment decisional law would develop a richly variegated pattern.”).
310 U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; see supra text accompanying note 50.
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certain spheres for State primacy, the Supremacy Clause notwithstanding. To put it another way, the 
Supremacy Clause makes supreme only those “Laws of the United States  . . . made in Pursuance of” 
the Constitution, but a federal law that purports to impose the death penalty within States that do not 
authorize capital punishment has not been “made in Pursuance of” the Constitution, but rather in 
violation of it, at least in those States.311
Again, Massey’s parallel arguments regarding the Ninth Amendment are compelling.  He 
notes that the Anti -Federalists feared that the Supremacy Clause would grant the central government 
“the authority to make its legislation supreme – displacing any contrary state statutory or 
constitutional law.”312 Thus, they proposed and ultimately won ratification of the Ninth Amendment 
to counteract that authority, at least in part.313 Admitting that his reading of the Ninth Amendment
“is radical stuff” because it “amounts to a form of reverse preemption,”314 Massey contends 
persuasively that such a reading is compelled by its “text, history, and structural role in the 
Constitution.”315  In the same way, the analysis used here demonstrates that a “situational” Eighth 
Amendment, one that might vary State by State, coheres best with the Amendment’s text and history, 
the underlying premises of the Anti-Federalists, and existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
311 Whether the federal death penalty statutes are unconstitutional on their face for failing to exempt States that 
do not authorize capital punishment, or whether, to the contrary, under a severability analysis, the statutes are 
unconstitutional only as applied in such a State, is a question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
312 Massey, supra note 171, at 1236.
313 See id. at 1238 (“[T]he [N]inth [A]mendment was originally intended to allow the people of each state  to 
define unenumerated rights under their own constitutions and laws, free from federal interference.’”) (quoting 
Wilmarth, supra note 172, at 1297-98).
314 Id. at 1233.
315 Id. at 1245.
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3. The Impact of the Sixth Amendment Jury and Vicinage Clauses
One might also observe that, if the injection of local values into the sentencing decision is 
the goal, then the Jury and Vicinage Clauses are sufficient to the task.  Recall that the Anti-
Federalists, dissatisfied with the jury-trial right already provided in Article III, spent much of their 
time, energy, and political capital fighting for an enhanced jury-trial right that would better allow 
local sympathies to work on behalf of the defendant.316  If the local community did not believe death 
was an appropriate sentence, they could decline to impose it.  If, on the other hand, the community 
believed death to be appropriate in a federal case, despite its absence as an option at the State level, 
the imposition of capital punishment arguably would offend no values of federalism.
One answer to this is that it proves too much, for the same can be said of any of the 
criminal procedure protections contained in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  If the Jury and 
Vicinage Clauses were sufficient to protect the values of federalism in criminal trials, none of these 
provisions would have been necessary.  But the Anti-Federalists were not willing to put all their eggs 
in the jury box.
The more complete answer is that the argument is anachronistic – it assumes a level of jury 
involvement during sentencing that did not exist in 1791. At that time, capital crimes uniformly 
carried with them a mandatory death sentence.317 There simply was no discretion to be brought to 
bear on the sentence by the jury’s “voice of the community.”318 Jury sentencing in capital cases did 
not take hold until about fifty years later319 and even today is not constitutionally required.320 Indeed, 
316 See supra notes 203 to 210 and accompanying text.
317 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976). 
 
318 See Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 621, 639-41 (2004)
(explaining that juries could control sentence only by deciding which crime, if any, to convict defendant of).
319 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291.
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it is precisely because sentencing generally takes place without input from the jury that the Eighth 
Amendment was thought so critical.  Just as the Anti- Federalists sought, via the Fourth 
Amendment’s restriction on the issuance of warrants, to hem in federal judges when acting without a 
jury, so too did they design the Eighth Amendment to constrain those judges when acting alone in 
other contexts: when setting bail and when sentencing a defendant.321
Of course, in a capital case, a jury could always acquit against the evidence to spare the 
defendant’s life, and a constitutional constraint on punishment might therefore be thought 
unnecessary.  But jury nullification is a blunt instrument.  Certainly, there might be cases in which 
the local community would feel that a federal prosecution and conviction of the highest charged 
offense were justified, but execution was not.  Relying solely on the jury-trial right to give voice to 
the community’s sentiments would put the jury in such cases to the difficult choice of sending a man 
to the gallows despite community feelings to the contrary or sending the (possibly dangerous) 
defendant back into the community, at least when not offered the alternative of conviction of a lesser 
offense.
4. Does the Eighth Amendment Prohibit Disproportionate Federal Punishment?
The most cogent objection to the rule proposed here is based on a “no limiting principle” 
argument.  If the Eighth Amendment forbids the federal government from imposing modes of 
punishment not imposed in the State where the criminal conduct occurred, then, by virtue of the 
Amendment’s proportionality component,322 it also forbids the federal government from imposing 
320 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984).
321 See Amar, supra note 168, at 87 (“[I]n those aspects of a criminal case that might involve a judge acting 
without a jury – issuing arrest warrants, setting bail, and sentencing – additional restrictions came into play via the 
Fourth Amendment warrant clause and the Eighth Amendment.”).
322 See supra part II.C.3.
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sentences of imprisonment greater than those meted out by that State for the same, or a functionally 
equivalent, crime.323  Taken to its logical conclusion, the federal government may not even 
criminalize certain conduct within a State if the conduct is not prohibited by that State, since the 
State punishment – nothing – will always be less than the federal punishment.
There is no simple answer to this question and this Article does not attempt one.  It may be 
that the proportionality guarantee that the Court has located in the Eighth Amendment does not really 
exist there.  Or it may be that the Eighth Amendment does indeed prohibit federal punishments that 
exceed State punishments for the same or similar crime committed in the same place.  Or, as is most 
likely, the Eighth Amendment might generally prohibit the federal government from exacting a 
greater sanction than does the State where the crime occurred, but that other factors, such as a clearly 
more substantial federal interest or clear evidence of State parochialism, might warrant an exception 
to the rule.  For example, if a State decided not to criminalize treason at all, the federal government 
should still be able to punish the traitor if his treasonous activities take place within that State, for 
treason is a quintessentially federal crime.  Likewise, if a State decided to punish murder generally 
with a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole, but to punish murder of a federal official 
with five years in prison, the federal government need not be bound by the State’s transparently 
parochial attempt to de-value the lives of federal officers.  Aside from these preliminary thoughts, the 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article and remains an area for further study.
323 Steven Clymer and Michael O’Hear have made related arguments.  Clymer has argued that because of the 
disparate and adverse treatment of defendants in federal courts as compared with those in state courts in a number of 
different areas, including but not limited to sentencing, federal prosecutors are required by equal protection 
principles to have a rational basis for prosecuting anyone who might be prosecuted in state court.  See Steven D. 
Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 652-68 (1997).  O’Hear has 
contended that lack of uniformity between sentences for similar federal and State crimes should generally be a basis 
for a downward departure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 725.  Neither 
goes so far as to make the claim that adverse sentencing disparities that inure to the detriment of those prosecuted in 
federal court are absolutely barred as “unusual” punishments.
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Yet this does not detract from the principle set forth here.  All agree that prohibitions on 
modes of punishment are directly contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.  Moreover, when a State 
has ruled out a mode of punishment for even the most serious crimes, there is little danger that it is 
acting out of parochial self-interest or not properly taking into account a distinctive ly federal interest.  
Rather, it has decided to tie itself to the mast, to impose on itself a constraint with respect to crime 
prevention.  There can be no surer way to know that a State has rejected a mode of punishment for 
reasons sufficient to bind the federal government when acting within its borders than that the 
constraint it seeks to impose on the federal government it also imposes on itself.324
CONCLUSION
Donald Fell. Marvin Gabrion. Dustin Honken.  Angela Johnson.  Gary Sampson. By all 
accounts, these are brutal murderers who deserve the harshest sanction allowed by the laws of the 
States in which they committed their heinous crimes.  However, all five face a punishment more
severe than those permitted by State law .  Each awaits execution on federal death row even though 
none of the States in which the crimes occurred permits capital punishment.  Alfonso Rodriguez Jr.
might be next.
It would be difficult to conclude that the Anti-Federalists were foes of harsh punishment.  
It is unlikely that many of them advocated abolition of the death penalty, or even that they foresaw 
that nearly one-quarter of the States would eventually choose that path.  What is likely is that, were 
they alive today, most of them would shudder at the specter of Fell, Gabrion, Honken, Johnson, 
Sampson, and potentially Rodriguez, condemned to die by a powerful central government against 
the express policy choice of the people of the States of Vermont, Michigan, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
324 Cf. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]here is 
no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”).
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and North Dakota.  And it is doubtful that the Anti-Federalists would view a prohibition of the 
federal death penalty in any State that does not authorize capital punishment as some extreme or 
extravagant interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  
Instead, they would deem such a prohibition to be at that Amendment’s core.
